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NEITHER JUSTICE, NOR OASIS:
ALGERIA’S AMNESTY LAW
INTRODUCTION

T

he notion that justice shall be done, regardless of its looming real
world effects, is not a recent phenomenon: It is ancient. As early
as 43 B.C., the statesman Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus is
attributed as having stated, fiat justitia ruat cœlum—“let justice be done,
though heaven should fall.”1 Setting aside this maxim as outdated, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
instead drew from Hegel’s maxim, fiat justitia ne pereat mundus—“let
justice be done lest the world should perish.”2 The critical responses to
and tension between these two Latin phrases largely informs the debate
this Note treats, namely, whether there can be amnesties for international
crimes, and more particularly, whether Algeria’s 2006 amnesty law
conflicts with a duty to prosecute such grave violations.
Humanitarian and human rights law is presently struggling through an
enforcement crisis. After the Nuremberg Trials, the world witnessed a
sprawling gap in accountability that has only more recently been broken
with the landmark formation of the ICTY, International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), Special Court for Sierra Leone
(“SCSL”), and International Criminal Court (“ICC”), among other
significant developments.3 Nevertheless, amnesty laws4 have been and
1. “Let justice be done, though the world perish,” The Columbia World of
Quotations, no. 21998, 1996, available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/98/21998.html.
This maxim was later adopted as the motto of Ferdinand I (1558–1564) in the
permutation, fiat justitia et pereat mundus, id., and also invoked by Lord Mansfield in his
historic 1772 judgment declaring the unlawfulness of slavery. STEVEN M. WISE, THOUGH
THE HEAVENS MAY FALL: THE LANDMARK TRIAL THAT LED TO THE END OF HUMAN
SLAVERY 173 (2005).
2. See Antonio Cassese, The Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, para. 18, Nov. 14,
1994, http://www.un.org/icty/rapportan/first-94.htm.
3. In addition, the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court is active. The Ad-Hoc Court for East
Timor and Special Tribunal for Cambodia have also been set up. Although, the former
has been highly criticized by human rights advocates as a diversionary front. Ad-Hoc
Court for East Timor, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/eti
morindx.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). The latter body issued its first indictment in
July 2007. Nic Dunlop, Cambodia’s Trial by Fire, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007. There
have been serious issues with the tribunal, however, which has prompted the U.N. to
threaten withdrawal of support. Guy De Launey, UN Warning on Cambodia Tribunal,
BBC, Oct. 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7023303.stm.
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 92–93 (8th ed. 2004). Generally defined, amnesty is a
“forgetfulness, oblivion; an intentional overlooking” and is etymologically related to the
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continue to be passed in countries with serious records of human rights
crimes,5 reducing or eliminating punishment for perpetrators of these
abuses. Supporters of amnesty laws maintain that retributive justice may
not be required because “the heavens” will otherwise fall even further:
Such laws may be necessary to end recurrent violence within a state.
Amnesties then function strategically to aide the state’s transition,
theoretically to a more just and prosperous society. On the other hand,
opponents argue that amnesties threaten “the world” to the extent that
they spawn a widespread deficit of justice and undermine the essence of
humanity.
From 1992 to 1998,6 Algeria experienced a “dirty war”7 that claimed
the lives of between 100,000 to 200,000 people, and in which tens of
thousands more were brutalized. In 2006, fourteen years after the
initiation of the conflict, the controversial Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation (“the Charter”) was put into effect. Introduced by
President Abdelaziz Boutiflika, the Charter granted broad amnesty for
select universal crimes committed during the war.8 A Draft Charter,
released six months prior, explicitly justified this measure as vital, if not
necessary to lead Algeria permanently out of chaos.9
The present Note seeks to address meaningfully whether this
legislation is legally valid to the extent that it shields prosecutions.10

Greek word for oblivion or not remembering. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1989). Contrastingly, a pardon is legally defined as “[t]he act or an instance of officially
nullifying punishment or other legal consequences of a crime. A pardon is usu[ally]
granted by the chief executive of a government.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th
ed. 2004).
5. See infra Part III(f).
6. While these are the years that witnessed the worst of the violence, arguably
Algeria’s conflict has not completely ceased. See infra Part IV and Conclusion.
7. “Dirty war” most accurately describes what the country underwent. This term has
been defined as “an offensive conducted by secret police or the military of a regime
against revolutionary and terrorist insurgents and marked by the use of kidnapping and
torture and murder with civilians often being the victims.” The Free Online Dictionary,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dirty+war (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). For an analysis
concerning why Algeria’s conflict should not be considered a “civil war,” see HUGH
ROBERTS, ALGERIA’S VEILED DRAMA, reprinted in THE BATTLEFIELD ALGERIA 1988–
2002: STUDIES IN A BROKEN POLITY 250, 254–59 (Verso) (2003).
8. See infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 59, pmbl.
10. At least two scholars have concluded that the Charter should not be recognized,
however they have done so after analysis based on non-legal criteria. See Valerie
Arnould, Amnesty, Peace and Reconciliation in Algeria, 227 CONFLICT, SECURITY &
DEV. 253 (2007); Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 283 (2007).
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Part I provides essential background on Algeria, its political and social
history leading up to adoption of the Charter as well as the context and
substance of the Charter itself. Focusing on the particular violations the
Charter amnesties, Part II analyzes whether a duty to prosecute these
crimes exists under the international and multilateral treaties to which
Algeria is a party. After establishing the incompatibility of the Charter
and these agreements, Part III then scrutinizes the present status of
customary law to find that states have an obligation to prosecute the most
serious war crimes as well as crimes against humanity. Addressing
several of the most prevalent policy issues, this section also argues in
favor of a broad customary duty to prosecute. Finally, Part IV begins
with an analysis of whether the Charter can be considered to amnesty
grave war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Dirty War, and concludes by suggesting that a duty to prosecute should be
and is consistent with the wishes of many of Algeria’s victims.
I. ALGERIA: THROUGH TURMOIL TO THE PRESENT
A. Pre-Independence Algeria: A Brief Historical Account
Algeria’s struggle for independence has profoundly shaped Algerian
politics and society. France occupied Algeria from 1830 until 1962 when
it was forced to give up its departments after eight years of one of the
bitterest conflicts within its formerly colonized lands.11 Faced with a
colonial regime that relegated Algerians to second-class status12 and
trampled over the native population’s sense of culture and tradition, in
late 1954, support for an independent Algerian state coalesced into active
11. According to official Algerian estimates, the war resulted in 300,000 orphans,
400,000 refugees, 700,000 migrants, and 3 million displaced people. BENJAMIN STORA,
ALGERIA 1830–2000: A SHORT HISTORY, 110–11 (Jane Marie Todd trans., Cornell U.
Press 2001). Although the most reliable assessment of total casualties during the war,
both French and Algerian, civil and military, is approximately 500,000, most of whom
were Algerian, id., the ruling party’s figure of 1 million Algerian deaths became widely
accepted. This figure became so central to the country’s reputation, for example, that
Algeria is commonly referred to in Arabic as balad milyūn mujāhidīn, “country of a
million freedom fighters.”
12. “The colons enjoyed full rights; the colonized were ‘subjects’ not ‘citizens,’ liable
to special provisions: tallage, corvée, and detention . . . without due process. In 1881, a
Code de l’Indigénat (Native Code) was established, regularizing these repressive
measures.” Id. at 6. By 1955, for example, and according to French statistics, only 8 out
of the 2000 workers in the general state government were native Algerians. For every
15,342 indigenous Algerians, only 1 attended school, as opposed to 1 for every 227 Europeans living in the country. An Algerian made twenty-eight times less in gross
income than a European resident. Id. at 39.
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resistance, led by the Front de Libération Nationale (“FLN”).13 The fight
for independence eventually came to a close in a ceasefire in March
1962. This ceasefire was followed by a referendum on July 1, 1962, in
which 6 million people voted in favor of Algeria becoming an
independent state, with 16,534 objecting.14 Soon after, a sequence of
decrees was issued, amnestying grave offenses carried out by Algerian
and French forces in Algeria.15
In keeping with popular revolutionary sentiment, though it was initially
mobilized to overthrow French colonial rule, the Algerian army proved
to endure in strength, dominating Algerian politics to date with a power
difficult to underestimate. Similarly, the FLN emerged to become the
sole ruling party in post-independence Algeria, building its legitimacy
upon a constructed legacy that it exclusively liberated the Algerian
people from colonial domination and founded the modern Algerian
state.16 This narrative long held immense appeal among not only
Algerians outraged by pervasive economic, political, and cultural
subjugation, but also other states of the global South, with which Algeria

13. Insurrection began in November 1954 in a series of well-organized, concurrent
attacks by the FLN. Id. at 35–36. Riots in over two-dozen villages and towns followed in
August 1955. Id. at 43–44. France responded by sending in troops, strengthening its
security forces, and in March 1956, voting into effect a law providing for “special
powers,” which forebodingly set aside the majority of safeguards for individual liberties
in Algeria. Id. at 44, 46. The FLN subsequently began a string of attacks in the capital, in
what infamously became known as the Battle of Algiers. While the FLN engaged in
guerilla warfare tactics, including bombings of European civilians, French paratroopers
struggled to put down the insurgency, which it succeeded in doing by September 1957,
however not without practicing routine torture and disappearing approximately 3000
people. Id. at 47, 49, 50–52. The French also placed tens of thousands of Algerians in
detention camps without due process. Id. at 53. Violence continued to be exchanged not
only between the French and Algerian forces, but also between Algerian political
factions. Id. at 59. In August 1956, though, other active parties and groups were
assimilated into the FLN, persuaded by the party that a single, greater unity was
necessary if Algeria was to overcome the strength of the French forces. Id. at 60–61. A
revamped armed branch of the FLN then spread throughout the country, fighting under
daunting conditions. Id. at 61–62.
14. Id. at 97–98, 104.
15. Id. at 113. For translated text of some of the key decrees as well as an account of
the strained evolution of French-Algerian relations vis-à-vis Algeria’s War of
Independence, see Shiva Eftekhari, Note, France and the Algerian War: From a Policy of
“Forgetting” to a Framework for Accountability, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 413,
424–26 (2003).
16. The accuracy of this nationalist “myth” put forth by the FLN is questionable, as
other key players were also influential. ROBERT MALLEY, THE CALL FROM ALGERIA:
THIRD WORLDISM, REVOLUTION AND THE TURN TO ISLAM, 34–35 (1996).
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actively aligned itself.17 Over time, however, the perpetual
commemoration of and struggle for greater freedom from external
oppression was unable to overcome hardships within the Algerian state.
B. Algeria’s Dirty War
In the mid-1980s the revolutionary socialist government began to face
mounting discontent, brought about by a combination of economic
troubles18 and general estrangement from an ossified and corrupt
regime.19 In October 1988, this discontent erupted across the country in
riots and demonstrations against state power. After nearly a week, the
army was called in: More than 500 people, mostly youths, were killed.20
The regime also retaliated by torturing people on a widespread basis, a
fact the government itself later admitted.21 President Chadli Benjedid’s
response astounded many. Benjedid introduced a series of reforms, the
most notable of which was a new constitution in 1989 that secured
essential freedoms and granted the right to form political associations.22
Algeria then witnessed a swell of civil society participation that called
into question post-independence power dynamics. Numerous political
opposition parties, both secular and Islamist, were registered.23
In June 1990, free multiparty local elections took place for the first
time in Algeria’s history, elections in which the Front Islamique du Salut
(“FIS”), a party with an Islamist platform, won a majority.24 With
17. Id. at 141–49, 210.
18. By 1986, oil prices had dropped dramatically, which, in a non-diversified
economy, meant that the Algerian state could not continue its program of social welfare
as it had in its prime. Id. at 208–09.
19. For example, in 1991, “the former prime minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, claimed
that government officials had siphoned off [twenty-six] billion dollars, [a sum] equivalent
to the amount of Algeria’s foreign debt.” MARTIN STONE, THE AGONY OF ALGERIA, 108
(1997).
20. Human Rights in Algeria, Testimony by Tom Malinowski to the U.S. House of
Representatives, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 4, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/
03/04/algeri10260.htm.
21. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1992, Human Rights Watch, http://www.
hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Mew-01.htm#P71_39546 (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
22. MICHAEL WILLIS, THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE IN ALGERIA: A POLITICAL HISTORY,
111–12 (1996). This move should not necessarily be construed as the initiation of a
genuine democratic transition. Instead, it was likely pushed by the army, which arguably
viewed political reforms as a strategy to fragment dissent, thereby preserving its
dominance. See, e.g., Rolf Schwarz, Human Rights Discourse and Practice as Crisis
Management: Insights from the Algerian Case, 7 J. N. AFR. STUD. 57, 66–67 (2002).
23. STORA, supra note 11, at 198–99.
24. For a thorough history of the development of Islamist politics in Algeria, see
WILLIS, supra note 22. While treatment of the FIS’s popularity is beyond the scope of
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parliamentary elections approaching, the FIS held demonstrations against
the regime’s manipulation of the process. This prompted the army to
impose martial law and imprison FIS leadership in June 1991.25 The first
round of parliamentary elections was nevertheless held in December
1991 and the FIS secured a majority of seats. Justified on the basis of
“saving” the country from Islamist politics,26 the army generals staged a
coup d’état the following month, marking the end of Algeria’s
democratic bout.27 Benjedid was ousted and a provisional governing
body was erected in lieu of a presidency, the Haut Conseil d’Etat
(“HCE”), comprised of a quintet of men who were to rule the country
until Boutiflika’s election in 1999.28 The FIS was banned and a state of
emergency was declared.29
Algeria then experienced a gradual descent into chaos. One of the
historic leaders of the FLN and the then chairman of the HCE,
Mohammed Boudiaf, was shot dead by one of his bodyguards during a
speech.30 Armed Islamist factions drawing from the FIS’s support base
soon emerged and carried out guerilla attacks. The army, then,
employing “torture, humiliations and deadly reprisals,” not only sought
to uproot the fighters, but also embarked on a “policy of terror against
the people to dissuade them from supporting the armed struggle
groups.”31 The actions of security forces provoked increasing anger
this Note, it should be emphasized that there were various and complex factors,
especially socio-economic, contributing to the party’s success. For an account of the Dirty War and its roots, see LUIS MARTINEZ, THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR: 1990–1998 (Jonathan Derrick trans., Colum. U. Press 2000).
25. STORA, supra note 11, at 209.
26. See, e.g., The Junta in Court, Algeria-Watch, Sept. 2002, http://www.algeriawatch.org/en/aw/junta_court.htm.
27. The legitimacy of the overthrow was and remains immensely controversial.
Debate largely centers upon the relation “between” Islamist politics and democracy, and
more particularly, the nature of the FIS. For a closer examination of these issues, see for
example Peter A. Samuelson, Pluralism Betrayed: The Battle Between Secularism and
Islam in Algeria’s Quest for Democracy, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 309 (1995) (arguing that the
regime’s coup was unjustified, the threat of the FIS overestimated, and the takeover
worse than honoring the majority election results).
28. On the composition of the HCE, see for example WILLIS, supra note 22, at
250–52.
29. Id. at 256–57.
30. The circumstances surrounding his death are both suspicious and contested. It is
probable that his reluctance to cooperate with the army generals caused his assassination
by regime insiders. See, e.g., MARTIN EVANS & JOHN PHILLIPS, ALGERIA: ANGER OF THE
DISPOSSESSED 177–80 (2007); WILLIS, supra note 22, at 263–66; Operation Boudiaf,
Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres, http://www.anp.org/affaireboudiaf/engaff
boudiaf.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
31. MARTINEZ, supra note 24, at 21–22.
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among certain FIS sympathizers, who until 1993 had remained passive.32
While this rage spurred Islamist armed forces to mobilize against the
security forces, it also led to attacks against civilians,33 whom they
perceived to be against them, as they were not actively championing their
cause.34
This abbreviated narration of the opening events of the Dirty War
illustrates the basic patterns of violence that were to continue at a
heightened level until the late 1990s, when the scale of the conflict began
to decrease. Numerous massacres took place.35 Bomb attacks, often in
public places, were frequent. In addition to security forces victimizing
women, including by rape,36 opposition groups raped and abducted
women,37 sometimes torturing them and sometimes murdering them.38
Security forces joined by state-armed militias and Islamist groups killed
each other and civilians alike.39 It is estimated that tens of thousands of
people were tortured at the hands of state security forces40 after the
practice became institutionalized in the early 1990s, mostly taking place

32. Id. at 48, 60–61.
33. STORA, supra note 11, at 214.
34. MARTINEZ, supra note 24, at 72, 76–77.
35. There are serious concerns that the state security forces were behind the massacres. HABIB SOUAÏDIA, LA SALE GUERRE: LE TÉMOIGNAGE D’UN ANCIEN OFFICIER DES
FORCES DE L’ARMÉE ALGÉRIENNE 88–90 (Découverte 2001). See also, e.g., NESROULAH
YOUS, QUI A TUÉ À BENTALHA?: CHRONIQUE D’UN MASSACRE ANNONCÉ (Découverte
2000). For an overview of both of these books as well as an appraisal of the credibility of
their accounts, see HUGH ROBERTS, FRANCE AND THE LOST HONOUR OF ALGERIA’S ARMY,
reprinted in THE BATTLEFIELD ALGERIA 1988–2002: STUDIES IN A BROKEN POLITY 305,
309-13 (Verso) (2003). See also, generally, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ALGERIAN MASSACRES
(Youcef Bedjaoui, Abbas Aroua, & Meziane Aït-Larbi eds., Hoggar 1999), available at
http://www.hoggar.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102&Itemid=3&
limit=1&limitstart=2 (providing a history of and perspectives on the massacres).
36. E.g., Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1995, Human Rights Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/MIDEAST-01.htm#P137_26320 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2008).
37. For an exploration of women and gender identity in Algerian history and society
from pre-colonial times to the present, see generally MARNIA LAZREG, THE ELOQUENCE
OF SILENCE: ALGERIAN WOMEN IN QUESTION (1994).
38. E.g., Algeria: Fear and Silence: A Hidden Human Rights Crisis, Amnesty International, Nov. 19, 1996, at 32, http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE28011
1996ENGLISH/$File/MDE2801196.pdf [hereinafter Fear and Silence].
39. E.g., Extrajudicial Killings, Algeria-Watch, Apr. 1999, http://www.algeriawatch.org/en/aw/extrajudicial_killings.htm.
40. E.g., January 1992–January 2007: Fifteen Years of Atrocities and Impunity in
Algeria, Algeria-Watch, Jan. 11, 2007, http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/15_years.htm
[hereinafter Fifteen Years of Atrocities].
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at secret detention sites.41 Between 1992 and 1998 alone, state security
forces disappeared approximately 7000 Algerians.42
C. Attempts at National “Reconciliation”: 1999–2008
Efforts responding to the violence have not been limited to the Charter.
In January 1995, under the auspices of the Sant’Edigio Community in
Rome, six key opposition parties, including the FIS, signed the Platform
for a Peaceful Resolution of Algeria’s Crisis, an agreement the Algerian
government vehemently rejected.43 In February 1995, however, the state
adopted a clemency law, Qānūn al-rahma, “aimed at repentant
terrorists.” 44 An estimated 250 to 300 militants took advantage.45 The
41. E.g., Fear and Silence, supra note 38, at 41. The most frequent torture techniques
include:
[T]he ‘chiffon’ method (the detainee is tied in a horizontal position to
a bench and cloth is inserted in his mouth, then his nose is held
closed and a mixture of dirty water and chemicals is poured in his
mouth in large quantities causing choking and swelling of the
stomach); the ‘chalumeau’ (blowtorch, which is used to burn the face
and parts of the detainee’s body); electric shocks applied to the ears,
genitals, anus and other sensitive parts of the detainee’s body; tying a
rope around the detainee’s penis and/or testicles causing swelling of
the genitals; and beatings all over the body, especially on the
sensitive parts. Others methods reported are burnings on the body
with cigarettes; insertion of bottles, sticks and other objects,
including firearms, in the anus; putting glue in the detainee’s anus;
placing the detainee’s penis in open drawers and shutting the drawer;
and suspending the detainee in contorted positions.
Id. at 44. Additional forms of torture involve castration, amputating fingers, and gauging
out eyes with forks and knives. La République Torture, Movement Algérien des Officiers
Libres, http://www.anp.org/frenindex/torture.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
42. This is the highest number of known disappearances in any state during or
subsequent to this timeframe, second only to Bosnia. Time for Reckoning: Enforced
Disappearances and Abductions in Algeria, Human Rights Watch (2003) at 3,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/algeria0203/algeria0203.pdf [hereinafter Time for
Reckoning]. Algeria-Watch puts forth the figure of 20,000 disappeared between January
1992 and January 2007. Fifteen Years of Atrocities, supra note 40.
43. HUGH ROBERTS, ALGERIA’S RUINOUS IMPASSE AND THE HONOURABLE WAY OUT,
reprinted in THE BATTLEFIELD ALGERIA 1988–2002: STUDIES IN A BROKEN POLITY 160,
171–75 (Verso) (2003) (elaborating upon the significance of the agreement).
44. Among other measures, the law prohibited prosecution for individuals who
belonged to certain groups and did not perpetrate offenses “leading to loss of human life,
permanent disability, breach of the moral or physical integrity of citizens or destruction
of public property.” U.N. Committee Against Torture, Second Periodic Reports of States
Parties Due in 1994: Algeria, para. 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/25/Add.8 (May 30, 1996) [hereinafter CAT Report].
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Ministry of the Interior declared in August 1998 that offices were being
opened in each wilāya46 to process complaints of disappearances,47 which
the National Human Rights Observatory, set up in February 1992,48
oversaw. In March 2001, this body was replaced with the ad hoc
National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights,49 charged with handling the issue of the disappeared.50
Based on the commission’s report completed four years later, though
never released, the human rights commissioner admitted that state
security forces disappeared 6146 people.51 In July 1999, three months
after becoming president, Boutiflika introduced the “Law of Civil
Harmony.”52 After being passed by Parliament, this initiative allegedly
received broad backing in a referendum,53 but it was widely criticized in
45. Tobias Schumacher, The EU and Algeria: A Forgotten Case?, EuroMeSCo
Research Seminar “Democratization and Human Rights,” July/Aug. 2006, at 3,
http://www.euromesco.net/images/enews_9_en.pdf.
46. Wilāya is the Algerian-Arabic word for “state,” of which there are forty-eight in
the country.
47. Time for Reckoning, supra note 42, at 40. “Questions were quickly raised about
this initiative, first because these bureaus were part of the same ministry whose forces
were suspected in many of the ‘disappearances,’ and second because their working
methods and powers to collect information were never made public.” Id.
48. CAT Report, supra at 44, para. 34.
49. Executive decree No. 03-299 (11 Sept. 2003) art. 3 (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel
n° 03-299 du 14 Rajab 1424 correspondant au 11 septembre 2003 complétant le décret
présidentiel n° 01-71 du 30 Dhou El Hidja 1421 correspondant au 25 mars 2001 portant
création de la commission nationale consultative de promotion et de protection des droits
de l’Homme (CNCPPDH).”
50. Id.
51. “Reconciliation” at the Price of Truth and Justice?, Algeria Watch, Aug. 26,
2005, http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/truth_justice.htm. Associations for families of
the disappeared, however, maintain that they have more than 8000 files documenting
disappearances. Chronology (Part Two), Algeria-Watch, Sept. 10, 2006, http://www.
algeria-watch.org/en/policy/chronology_2.htm.
52. The stated purpose was “to se[t] up . . . particular measures aimed at offering
suitable solutions for those persons involved in acts of terrorism and subversion.”
Law of Civil Harmony, Website of International Humanitarian Law, July 13, 1999,
http://www.wihl.nl/finals/Algeria/AL.LIM.LAW%20OF%20CIVIL%20HARMONY.199
9.pdf.
53. Algeria: Attacks on Justice 2000, International Commission of Jurists, Aug. 13,
2001, http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=2549&lang=en [hereinafter Attacks on
Justice 2000]. Reduced sentences were allowed for persons who did not commit
massacres or bomb public places. Granting the option of creating special Probation
Committees in each wilāya to decide applications for probation, the law permitted this
relief to those who neither committed or participated in the aforementioned crimes, nor
those “that have led to the death of people” or involved rape. Exoneration from
prosecution was afforded to the same class of persons as probation, except the additional
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public opinion, the press, as well as by secular political movements.54
According to government figures, approximately 5500 persons
surrendered.55 And building upon the Law of Civil Harmony, in January
2000, Boutiflika extended a general amnesty56 to members of two Islamist groups,57 but its precise terms were not revealed.58
The Charter is thus the most recent in a series of attempts at securing
lasting peace. Although a Draft Charter was revealed on August 15,
2005,59 the actual Charter was not disclosed prior to its adoption.60 The
bar of “permanent disabling of a person” was included. This law did not apply to state
security forces. Law of Civil Harmony, supra note 52, art. 1–3, 7, 11–17, 27.
54. These forces “led a campaign against this law arguing that it constituted an
arbitrary impunity procedure for the abuses and crimes committed and a voluntary silence
regarding the conditions in which terrorism and repression developed and ceased.”
Hidouci, infra note 287, at 3. See also, e.g., EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 267
(“[Grassroots civilian pressure groups] wanted to express their pain and anger and
believed that, in denying truth and justice, Bouteflika’s transition process was
fundamentally flawed.”). A domestic opinion poll also suggested that less than half the
population supported the law. Id. at 270.
55. Algeria: Attacks on Justice 2002, International Commission of Jurists, Aug. 26,
2002, http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=2648&lang=en [hereinafter Attacks on
Justice 2002]. Even though the Law of Civil Harmony appeared specific enough to
further reconciliation, there have been criticisms that it was applied arbitrarily and
without meaningful investigation, thereby largely undermining its supposed value. See,
e.g., Attacks on Justice 2000, supra note 53; Truth and Justice on Hold: The New State
Commission on ‘Disappearances, Human Rights Watch, Dec. 2003, at 8,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/algeria1203/algeria1203.pdf. More importantly, this
amnesty violated international law for the same reasons that the Charter is legally invalid.
See infra Part II, III. But see Nina H.B. Jørgensen, The Scope and Effect of the Algerian
Law Relating to the Reestablishment of Civil Concord, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 681, 688
(2000). While violence by armed groups noticeably lowered in the beginning of 2000, it
swelled at the year’s end, for example, leaving 250 dead in the month of October. EVANS
& PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 265.
56. Executive decree No. 2000-03 (10 Jan. 2000) art. 3 (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel
n° 2000-03 du 4 Chaoual 1420 correspondant au 10 janvier 2000 portant grâce
amnistiante.”
57. Algeria, New Amnesty Law Will Ensure Atrocities Go Unpunished: Muzzles
Discussion of Civil Conflict: Joint Statement by Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and the International
Federation of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 1, 2006, http://hrw.org/
english/docs/2006/03/01/algeri12743.htm [hereinafter Atrocities Go Unpunished].
58. Attacks on Justice 2000, supra note 53. Killings by armed groups escalated by
20% in 2000 relative to the prior year. Attacks on Justice 2002, supra note 55.
59. Executive decree No. 05-278 (14 Aug. 2005) Annex (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel
n° 05-278 du 9 Rajab 1426 correspondant au 14 août 2005 portant convocation du corps
électoral pour le référendum du jeudi 29 septembre 2005 relatif à la réconciliation
nationale.” For an English translation of the Draft Charter, see Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Embassy of Algeria, London, Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation,

2008]

ALGERIA'S AMNESTY LAW

985

former does not explicitly provide for the amnestying of security forces
and does not mention the jail sentences and fines that are to be imposed
for voicing criticism concerning the handling of the “National
Tragedy.”61 Nevertheless, forty-five days later, Boutiflika’s initiative was
put to a referendum on September 29, 2005. According to official
figures, 97.36% of the Algerian populace approved the Charter,62 with an
average voter turnout of 79.76%63 among approximately 18.3 million
registered voters.64 There was no independent monitoring of the voting.65
Algeria’s full cabinet approved the final version on February 27, 2006,
but Parliament was not in session and did not debate the Charter.66
Among its most important provisions, the Charter extends amnesty to
persons who did not commit or participate in massacres, public
bombings, and rape.67 Those who have already been imprisoned and

http://www.algerianembassy.org.uk/charter_for_peace_and_national_r.htm (last visited
Mar. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Draft Charter].
60. Joint NGO Letter on the Occasion of the EU-Algeria Association Council on
20–21st March 2006: Human Rights Concerns at the EU-Algeria Association Council,
Human Rights Watch, Mar. 14, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/14/algeri130
24.htm.
61. Compare Draft Charter, supra note 59, with Charte pour la paix, infra note 67,
art. 45.
62. The deceptively simple question posed to voters was, “Do you agree with the
Draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which is proposed to you?”
Executive decree No. 05-278 (14 Aug. 2005) art. 2 (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel n° 05-278
du 9 Rajab 1426 correspondant au 14 août 2005 portant convocation du corps électoral
pour le référendum du jeudi 29 septembre 2005 relatif à la réconciliation nationale.”
(author’s translation).
63. Some areas called for a boycott of the referendum, and the reported voter turnout
in the capital was 32% lower than its usual levels. See Algerians Overwhelmingly OK
National Peace Charter, ARAB NEWS, Oct. 1, 2005, http://www.arabnews.com.
64. Algeria Today: Algerians Voted Massively for a Peaceful Future, Embassy of the
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Washington, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1, http://www.
algeria-us.org/ALGERIA%20TODAY/ALGERIA_TODAY%20SEP%2032%202005.pdf
[hereinafter Algeria Today].
65. Michael Slackman, Algerian Voters Said to Approve President’s Postwar Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005.
66. Atrocities Go Unpunished, supra note 57.
67. Legislative decree No. 06-01 (27 Feb. 2006) art. 5–6, 10 (Alg.). “Ordonnance
n° 06-01 du 28 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 27 février 2006 portant mise en œuvre
de la Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale” [hereinafter Charte pour la paix].
Given Algeria’s history with prosecutions and its judiciary troubles, it is extremely unlikely the state will meaningfully prosecute these crimes in the near future. To date, Algeria has failed to offer substantial evidence of prosecutions for any gross human rights
violations. See, e.g., HRC Observations finales, infra note 114, para 7.
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sentenced and who did not engage in the aforementioned crimes are
pardoned.68 Articles 45 and 46 provide:
No legal proceedings may be initiated against an individual or
a collective entity, belonging to any component whatsoever of
the defense and security forces of the Republic, for actions
conducted for the purpose of protecting persons and property,
safeguarding the nation or preserving the institutions of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. The competent
judicial authorities are to summarily dismiss all accusations or
complaints.69
Anyone who, by speech, writing, or any other act, uses or
exploits the wounds of the National Tragedy to harm the
institutions of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, to weaken the state, or to undermine the good
reputation of its agents who honorably served it, or to tarnish
the image of Algeria internationally, shall be punished by
three to five years in prison and a fine of 250,000 to 500,000
dinars.70

In two separate decrees published alongside the Charter, under
specified measures, the Algerian State offers compensation to the
“victims of the national tragedy,” including the families of those who
68. Charte pour la paix, supra note 67, art. 8–10.
69. Id. art. 45. The translation of this article is from Atrocities Go Unpunished, supra
note 57. Implicitly, this provision tracks the non-amnestied crimes for members of armed
groups. It would be absurd to argue that massacres, public bombings, or rapes were
committed for “the purpose of protecting persons or property, [or] safeguarding the
nation.” (Although rape can be a form of torture, it is not “typically” justified on the basis
of extracting information.) In contrast, according to warfare tactics, it is logically
consistent, albeit unsound, to maintain that state forces tortured, disappeared, and
murdered people in furtherance of this specified end. Apparently, the state carefully
worded this article to allow room for such interpretation. The Human Rights Committee
criticized this ambiguity when it considered the Charter and implored the state to amend
it. See HRC Observations finales, infra note 114. See also CAT Observations finales,
infra note 100.
70. Charte pour la paix, supra note note 67, art. 46. The translation used can
be found at Atrocities Go Unpunished, supra note 57. This fine is approximately
$3812–$7625 USD as of October 6, 2007. The 2007 Algerian per capita GDP was
estimated to be $8100. Algeria Country Profile, CIA World Fact Book, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ag.html (last visited
Mar. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Algeria Country Profile]. The Human Rights Committee has
called for the abrogation of this provision. HRC Observations finales, infra note 114,
para. 8. See also CAT Observations finales, infra note 100, para. 17 (noting that the
Algerian state “should amend” article 46 in order to ensure an “effective remedy”)
(author’s translation).
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have been disappeared,71 as well as those who have participated in
“terrorism.”72
II. ALGERIA’S TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Given the history of the Dirty War, the systematic human rights
violations that the amnesty law shields are torture, extrajudicial
executions, and disappearances. Under humanitarian treaties, the
Charter’s amnestying of these crimes is not invalidated, as a perverse
result of Algeria’s conflict having been internal. On the other hand, each
of the multilateral and regional human rights treaties Algeria has
ratified73 undermines the legal soundness of the Charter with regard to
the duty to prosecute.
A. The Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3
How Common Article 3 relates to “grave breaches” under the Geneva
Conventions is crucial, as this article explicitly addresses internal armed
conflicts.74 The distinction between international and internal conflicts in
71. Executive decree No. 06-93 (28 Feb. 2006) art. 1–2 (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel
n° 06-93 du 29 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 28 février 2006 relatif à
l’indemnisation des victimes de la tragédie nationale.” The Algerian state has conditioned
this indemnification upon families declaring the death of their disappeared loved one.
Charte pour la paix, supra note note 67, art. 30. Troubled by this requirement, the Human
Rights Committee has recommended its abolishment. HRC Observations finales, infra
note 114, para. 13. See also CAT Observations finales, infra note 100, para. 13 (calling
for the removal of this stipulation and asserting that it constitutes “a form of inhumane
and degrading treatment”) (author’s translation).
72. Executive decree No. 06-94 (28 Feb. 2006) (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel n° 06-94
du 29 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 28 février 2006 relatif à l’aide de l’Etat aux
familles démunies éprouvées par l’implication d’un de leurs proches dans le terrorisme.”
73. Algeria entered a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with the European Community,
which went into force in September 2005. EUROPA, European Commission, External
Relations, Treaties Office, Association Agreements, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Algeria, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/trea
tiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=821 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
While this agreement contains a provision on human rights, it is very general and
therefore does not warrant much discussion. See Euro-Mediterranean Agreement
Establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of
the One Part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the Other Part, art. 2,
Oct. 10, 2005, O.J.E.U. L265/2 (2005).
74. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
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humanitarian law has serious repercussions, as the duties and rights
following from each may not be equal.75 Scholars have long been critical
of this division, arguing that it has not only become unwieldy particularly
for “internationalized” armed conflicts,76 but also frustrated the very
justice this body of law was meant to advance.77 States have a duty to
extradite or prosecute instances of grave breaches defined in the Geneva
Conventions, however it is not expressly provided for in internal
conflicts.
The prevailing opinion maintains that the aut dedere aut judicare78
obligation for grave breaches only applies to international conflicts.79
Nevertheless, at least one scholar has demonstrated how internal
conflicts can be consistently subsumed within the grave breaches
regime.80 Even if this regime applies only to international conflicts, there
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
75. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International
Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 199, 223–24 (1998).
76. See James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in
International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313 (2003).
77. See Bassiouni, supra note 75, at 224.
78. Latin for “extradite or prosecute.”
79. ANDREAS O’SHEA, AMNESTY FOR CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
143–44 (2002). One key argument supporting this view relies upon common article 2 to
the Geneva Conventions, which states: “[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
the High Contracting Parties.” Geneva Convention I, supra note 74, art. 2; Geneva
Convention II, supra note 74, art. 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 74, art. 2;
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 74, art. 2. As the extradite or prosecute duty belongs
to the “present Convention[s],” article 2 limits this obligation to international conflicts,
“between two or more High Contracting Parties.” See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, New
International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 341 (1998). In addition, as neither
common article 3 nor Protocol II mentions penal sanctions, it is maintained that their
application to internal conflicts is excluded. O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 144–45
(summarizing the arguments typically given for the non-applicability of the grave
breaches regime to internal conflicts).
80. In each of the Geneva Conventions, the provisions establishing the duty to
extradite or prosecute refer to “any of the grave breaches of the present Convention.”
Geneva Convention I, supra note 74, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 74,
at art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 74, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 74, art. 146. The inclusion of the wording, “the present Convention,” suggests the
aut dedere aut judicare provision applies to the entire treaty, which contains article 3
treating internal conflicts. The articles defining grave breaches that directly follow those
establishing this duty verify that they are “defining the nature of breaches of the other
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is a growing trend to blur the division between international and internal
conflicts and apply certain rules of war to the latter.81 In the meantime,
the aut dedere aut judicare duty does not reach amnesty laws such as
Algeria’s. Like countless other states, if Algeria can be considered
fortunate not to have had its war further complicated by outside state
actors, it is tragically ironic that the consequences of this
non-involvement under the Geneva Conventions means the difference
between furthering accountability and allowing for impunity.
B. Protocol II
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(“Protocol II”)82 not only governs Algeria’s Dirty War, but also directly
addresses amnesties in article 6(5). Ostensibly, this provision seems
troublesome for a duty to prosecute:
articles . . . rather than giving a complete definition of the norms that might be breached.”
O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 146. They provide: “Grave breaches to which the preceding
Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts.” Geneva Convention I,
supra note 74, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 74, art. 51; Geneva Convention
III, supra note 74, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 74, art. 147. It is further
argued that this reading is bolstered by the travaux préparatoires and succeeding
practice, demonstrating a purpose not to exclude internal conflicts from the grave breaches regime. O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 147–51.
Given the general consensus supporting the former analysis, a reading to the
contrary might seem superfluous at this point: Internal armed conflicts have “lost the
battle” for inclusion in the grave breaches regime! Nonetheless, it is important to recall
that the Trial and Appellate Chambers in Tadic differed when considering whether article
2 of the ICTY statute, which encompassed grave breaches under the Geneva
Conventions, covered non-international conflicts. Compare Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction, para. 50 (Aug. 10, 1995), with
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 78 (Oct. 2, 1995) (noting, however, that “contrary to the
drafters’ apparent indifference to the nature of the underlying conflicts, such an interpretation would authorize the International Tribunal to prosecute and punish certain conduct
in an international armed conflict, while turning a blind eye to the very same conduct in
an internal armed conflict.”) In a separate opinion, Judge Abi-Saab agreed with the Trial
Chamber, finding no international conflict requirement to article 2 of the ICTY statute.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, sec. 4 (Oct. 2, 1995).
81. See Bassiouni, supra note 75, at 224; Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist
View, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 312–13 (1999); Stewart, supra note 76, at 344.
82. Algeria ratified this instrument in August 1989. Secretary General, Status of the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/53/287 (Aug. 26, 1998).
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At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant
the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the
armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to
the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.83

While there have been a handful of decisions treating this article as
sanctioning amnesty laws following a civil conflict,84 this position is
dubious. Structurally, the provision on amnesty is nestled at the bottom
of a section devoted to penal prosecutions.85 In keeping with this
observation, the International Committee of the Red Cross offered:
The ‘travaux preparatoires’ of [article] 6(5) indicate that this
provision aims at encouraging amnesty, i.e., a sort of release at
the end of hostilities, for those detained or punished for the
mere fact of having participated in hostilities. It does not
aim at an amnesty for those having violated international
humanitarian law.86

The sounder interpretation, therefore, is that Protocol II considers the
permissibility of amnesty for general criminal sanctions after civil strife,
not for serious violations of humanitarian law.87
C. Convention Against Torture
There is a very strong basis for finding that the Charter breaches the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

83. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8,
1977, art. 6(5), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–2, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
84. The most prominent example is the AZAPO case analyzing the validity of South
Africa’s amnesty law. Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at para. 30 (S. Afr.). At least one
commentator has argued that this interpretation is sound based on the plenary meeting
notes for Protocol II. See Karen Gallagher, Note, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities
and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 176–78 (2000).
85. This implies that “the drafters were primarily interested in reintegrating insurgents
into national life.” Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the
Way Forward, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 93, 97 (1996).
86. Letter from Dr. Toni Pfanner, Head of the Legal Division, ICRC Geneva, to The
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Apr. 15,
1997, cited in Douglass Cassel, Accountability for International Crime and Serious
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for
International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197, 218
(1996).
87. See, e.g. Cassel, supra note 86.
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Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”)88 to the extent that it precludes
Algeria’s obligation89 to prosecute those among the security forces and
state-militias who carried out acts of torture.90 Article 7 sets forth that a
state party “shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not
extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution.”91
Some scholars have read this provision as “not explicitly requir[ing]
that a prosecution take place, let alone that punishment be imposed and
served,” article 7 only specifying that the state party must “submit the
case.”92 This particular wording may have been chosen, though, in order
to “respect the independence of national courts and the procedural rights
of defendants by avoiding language that suggested that a particular
outcome of prosecutions was required.”93 Similarly, it has further been
noted that the aut dedere aut judicare obligation is also included in such
fundamental conventions94 as the Convention on the Prevention and

88. Algerian ratified CAT on October 10, 1989. Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Algeria’s Homepage, Status of Ratifications,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvstatusbycountry?OpenView&Start=1&Count=25
0&Expand=3#3 (last visited Mar. 16, 2008) [hereinafter UNHCHR Algeria].
89. For a well-informed overview of approaches under Islamic law to the
(im)permissibility of torture, see Sadiq Reza, Torture and Islamic Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L.
21 (2007) (calling into doubt a relation between Islamic law and the practice of torture in
“Muslim-majority countries”).
90. CAT’s definition of “torture” restricts the scope of the Convention’s application
to Algerian security forces and state-armed civil militias. See Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46,
art.1(1), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT].
91. Id. art. 7.
92. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2604 (1991). See also Leila Nadya
Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 1020 (2006)
(noting CAT is “unclear” regarding scope of duty to prosecute, “leav[ing] a certain
degree of discretion to national legal systems in [its] implementation”).
93. Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 2604, n.306. See also Michael Scharf,
Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human
Rights: The Letter of Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute
Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 41, 46–47 (1997) (Such language was
intended “to reflect the developments in international standards of due process that had
occurred in the nearly forty years since the Genocide Convention was drafted in 1948.”).
94. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 451, 463–66
(1990).
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,95 and the Geneva Conventions.96
Seventeen additional international treaties feature this provision, many of
which deal with terrorism.97
A recent Preliminary Report before the General Assembly offers a
current interpretation of CAT’s aut dedere aut judicare provision:
It seems that the existing treaty practice . . . has already created a
sufficient basis for considering the extent to which the obligation to
extradite or prosecute, so important as a matter of international criminal
policy, has become a matter of concrete legal obligation . . . [S]everal
treaties (for example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) compel [s]tates
parties to introduce rules to enforce the aut dedere aut judicare
principle, according to which the State which does not order extradition
is obliged to prosecute . . . . States will therefore have to set up
appropriate mechanisms to ensure the effective enforcement of this
principle.98

This statement suggests that whether or not a conviction and sentence
is ultimately imposed, “submit[ting] the case to [a state party’s]
competent authorities” in accordance with article 7 means that at
minimum a prosecution must be brought. And fittingly, according to a
general comment the Committee Against Torture recently issued:
“[A]mnesties or other impediments which preclude or indicate
unwillingness to provide prompt and fair prosecution and punishment of
perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment violate the principle of
non-derogability.”99
95. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 6,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
96. Geneva Convention I, supra note 74, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note
74, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 74, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 74, art. 146.
97. This has led one scholar to observe that “the purpose of the principle is to ensure
that those who commit crimes under international law are not granted safe haven
anywhere in the world.” Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94, at 463–66. For a complete list of
these treaties, see Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty to Enact and Enforce Jurisdiction,
Amnesty International, (2001) at 21, http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/IOR530182001
ENGLISH/$File/IOR5301801.pdf. A recent overview of the issues involved in the aut
dedere aut judicare principle can be found at Report of the Int’l Law Commission, 394–
99, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
98. Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Commission, Preliminary Report on the Obligation
to Extradite or Prosecute (“Aut Dedere Aut Judicare”), para. 38–39, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/571 (June 7, 2006) (prepared by Zdzislaw Galicki)
[hereinafter Extradite or Prosecute Report].
99. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Implementation of
Article 2 by State Parties, para. 5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008).
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The committee invoked this declaration in its May 2008 concluding
observations on Algeria’s compliance with CAT.100 Offering strong
criticisms, the Committee Against Torture observed that the Charter’s
provisions amnestying armed groups and state forces “do not conform to
the obligation of every state party . . . to pursue the authors of [torture] . .
. .”101 After instructing the Algerian state to amend the Charter to clarify
that it does not amnesty acts of torture,102 the committee asserted: “The
state party should take without delay all necessary measures to guarantee
that . . . the authors of [torture, past or recent, including rape and forced
disappearances] are pursued and punished in a manner proportionate to
the gravity of acts committed . . . .”103 CAT therefore grounds a clear
duty to prosecute perpetrators of torture, which amnesty laws like
Algeria’s transgress.
D. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“International Covenant”),104 an effective remedy imposes duties upon
the Algerian state that conflict with the Charter. This fundamental
instrument establishes a states party’s commitment to “respect” and
“ensure” certain rights105 as well as provide an “effective remedy” when
these rights are violated, “notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”106 Emphasis has
been placed on the drafting history, which has been argued to express the
need for “ensuring accountability of government authorities for
violations, especially by ruling out the defenses of sovereign immunity
or following superior orders,” a purpose explicitly shown, for example,
in the above quoted clause.107

100. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Examen des Rapports Présentés par les États
Parties en Application de l’Article 19 de la Convention, Observations finales du Comité
contre la torture, Version Non Editee, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/DZA/CO/3 (2008)
[hereinafter CAT Observations finales].
101. Id. para. 11 (author’s translation).
102. Id.
103. Id. (author’s translation).
104. In December 1989, Algeria became a state party to the International Covenant as
well as the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
UNHCHR Algeria, supra note 88.
105. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) art.
2(1), 21st Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter International Covenant].
106. Id. art. 2(3)(a).
107. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94, at 475–76.
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Legal scholars have pointed to numerous decisions by the Human
Rights Committee (“HRC”) interpreting the right to an effective remedy
as requiring a state’s duty to investigate and prosecute breaches,108
particularly those involving torture and disappearances.109 Key decisions
date back as early as the mid-1980s.110 While it is accurate that in earlier
communications the committee acted more to encourage than assert a
duty to prosecute, leaving some discretion to the state,111 the language it
has employed has remarkably strengthened over the years to support an
unambiguous obligation. For example, in the case of Algeria alone, the
HRC has issued no fewer than six communications concerning torture
and disappearances that expressly declare that the Algerian state has a
duty to prosecute and punish perpetrators.112
108. Although the International Covenant provides for derogation “in time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation,” it is not permitted for “articles 6, 7, 8
(paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18.” International Covenant, supra note 105,
art. 4(1)–(2). A state party may derogate from neither the prohibition on torture contained
in article 7, nor articles 6 and 16, which respectively ground the right not to be
disappeared or extrajudicially killed. Id. art. 6, 16. The derivative rights of nonderogable
provisions that follow from article 2(3) are likewise nondergogable, even though this
provision is not expressly mentioned in article 4. See U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 29, State of Emergency (Article 4), para. 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).
109. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 2569–71; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94,
at 477–78.
110. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication
No. 107/1981, para. 15–16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2/107/1981 (1990); U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication No. 30/1978, para. 13(3), 15, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1/30/1978 (1985); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Muteba v. Zaire,
Communication No. 124/1982, para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/39/40/124/1982 (1984). These
communications did not involve discussion of amnesty laws. Nonetheless, in Rodriguez
v. Uruguay, considering Uruguay’s amnesty law, the HRC stated that “amnesties for
gross violations of human rights and legislation such as . . . [its] Ley de Caducidad de la
Pretension Punitiva del Estado are incompatible with the obligations of the State party
under the Covenant” and “urge[d]” Uruguay to investigate the allegations of torture and
provide for civil redress as well as compensation. U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Rodriguez v. Uruguay, Communications No. 322/1988, para. 12(4), 14 U.N. Doc. CCPR/
2/3/A/322/1988 (1994).
111. See Scharf, supra note 93, at 48–52.
112. The following pronouncement is typical of that contained in each of these
communications:
[T]he State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an
effective remedy, including a thorough and effective investigation into the disappearance and fate of the author’s son, his immediate
release if he is still alive, adequate information resulting from its
investigation, and adequate compensation for the author and her
family for the violations suffered by the author’s son. The State party
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Consistent with these communications, the committee considered
Algeria in October 2007113 and picked apart the Charter, stating that the
Algerian state should:
Take all appropriate measures to guarantee that grave human rights
violations brought to its attention, such as massacres, torture, rape, and
disappearances, are made the object of investigations, and that those
responsible for such violations, including state agents and members of
armed groups, are pursued and respond for their acts.114
Engage in a complete and independent investigation into every
allegation of disappearance, and after identification, pursue and punish
the guilty.115
Guarantee that all allegations of torture and cruel, inhumane and
degrading treatment are made the object of investigations brought by an
independent authority and that those responsible for such acts are
pursued and punished in a consequential manner.116

In addition, in paragraph 7(a) of its concluding observations, the
committee asserted: “[A]rticle 45 should be amended in order to clarify
that crimes such as torture, murder, and abductions are exempt from [its]

is also under a duty to prosecute criminally, try and punish those held
responsible for such violations. The State party is also under an
obligation to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Boucherf v. Algeria, Communication No. 1196/2003,
para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1196/2003 (2006) (emphasis added). See also, U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Aber v. Algeria, Communication No. 1439/2005, para. 9, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1439/2005 (2007); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Grioua v. Algeria,
Communication No. 1327/2004, para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1327/2004 (2007);
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Cheraitia v. Algeria, Communication No. 1328/2004,
para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1328/2004 (2007); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Medjnoune v. Algeria, Communication No. 1297/2004, para. 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/87/1297/2004 (2006); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Bousroual v. Algeria,
Communication No. 992/2001, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/992/2001 (2006).
113. The committee probed the state with an extensive list of twenty-seven issues, five
of which were directly related to the Charter. U.N. Human Rights Comm., List of Issues
to be Taken up in Connection with the Consideration of the Third Periodic Report of
Algeria, para. 3, 13, 22–23, 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DZA/Q/3 (2007).
114. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Examen des Rapports Présentés par les États Parties
Conformément á l’Article 40 du Pacte, Observations finales du Comité des droits de
l’Homme, Version Non Editee, para. 7(b), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DZA/CO/3/CRP.1 (2007)
(author’s translation) [hereinafter HRC Observations finales].
115. Id. para. 12(d) (author’s translation).
116. Id. para. 15(a) (author’s translation).
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application.”117 Although the HRC’s recommendations were not couched
in mandatory language, this does not detract from their legal force, as the
committee’s purpose is not to dictate, but rather to approach states in a
non-combative manner. These statements concerning the Charter are
remarkable in both number and degree of specificity. Given the Charter’s
central purpose to extinguish criminal actions118 as well as the HRC’s
statement in paragraph 7(a), the above-quoted references to “pursue and
respond” and “pursue and punish” indicate that perpetrators of gross
human rights violations are to be held criminally responsible. Thus, in
accordance with the International Covenant, Algeria, inter alia, must
prosecute and punish for the crimes it amnesties, namely, torture,
extrajudicial murders and disappearances.
E. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Article 7(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“African Charter”)119 provides that “[e]very individual shall have the
right to . . . an appeal to competent national organs against acts of
violating his fundamental rights . . . .”120 Article 5 expressly prohibits
torture, article 6 establishes a right to liberty and security, and article 26

117. “Moreover, the State party should make sure to inform the public that article 45
does not apply to declarations or proceedings for torture, extrajudicial executions, and
disappearances.” Id. para. 7(a) (author’s translation).
118. Within a paragraph on criminal punishments, the HRC noted: “[It] believes that
[the Charter], which bans all proceedings against units of the defense and security forces,
also appears to promote impunity and undermine the right to an effective remedy (articles
2, 6, 7, and 14 of the Covenant).” Id. para. 7 (author’s translation). At first glance, the
word “appear” may seem at odds with the committee’s strong recommendations.
However, the Algerian state vaguely referenced having criminally pursued and punished
perpetrators of abuses. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Summary Record of the 2495th
Meeting, para. 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2495 (2007); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Replies of the Government of the Algerian Republic to the List of Issues to be Taken up
in Connection with Consideration of the Third Periodic Report of Algeria, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/DZA/Q/3/Add.1 (2007) (noting prosecutions and convictions for members of
“legitimate defense groups,” but for “ordinary offenses”). Moreover, the right to an
effective remedy also imposes upon states the duty to investigate and disclose pertinent
information, which the Charter does not explicitly bar. If the committee used “appear”
instead of simply declaring that the Charter spawns impunity and violates the right to an
effective remedy, it was only giving the state the benefit of the doubt.
119. Algeria became a state party in March 1987. African Union, List of Countries
Which Have Signed, Ratified / Acceded to the African Union Convention on African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, http://www.achpr.org/english/ratifications/
ratification_charter_en.pdf [hereinafter Parties to African Charter].
120. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 7(1), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/
67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (June, 27, 1981) [hereinafter African Charter].
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sets forth a state’s “duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts . . .
.”121 With these particular articles in consideration, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”)
issued a set of Principles and Guidelines (“Guidelines”),122 in which it set
forth: “The granting of amnesty to absolve perpetrators of human rights
violations from accountability violates the right of victims to an effective
remedy.”123
Prior to the Guidelines, the commission expressed this principle
against such amnesties in consideration of communications submitted
against Mauritania.124 The communications involved claims of “grave or
massive violations of human rights,” including torture and
disappearances.125 In 1993, the Mauritanian parliament adopted an
amnesty law covering these violations, a law that the African
Commission noted: “[H]ad the effect of annulling the penal nature of the
precise facts and violations . . . [and] leading to the foreclosure of any
judicial actions . . . .”126 The commission declared that the state “has the
duty to adjust its legislation to harmonise it with its international
obligations,”127 which, read with the preceding observation, implies a
duty to prosecute. Confirming this obligation, the commission instructed
Mauritania to “identify and bring to book the authors of the violations . .
. .”128
Given not only the Guidelines’ pronouncement on the irreconcilability
of general amnesty laws with the African Charter, but also the African
Commission’s identification of a duty for Mauritania to reframe its
amnesty law, the African Charter prohibits amnesty laws for grave
human rights violations. This forbiddance includes amnestying violations
of torture and disappearances, as in the case of Mauritania, and
121. Id. art. 5–6, 26.
122. Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in
Africa, pmbl., OAU Doc. DOC/OS(XXX)247 (adopted 2001).
123. Id. para. C(d). An effective remedy entails “access to justice,” “reparation for the
harm suffered,” and “access to the factual information concerning the violations.”
Id. para. C(b). Furthermore, “[e]very State has an obligation to ensure that . . . any
persons whose rights have been violated, including by persons acting in an official
capacity, has an effective remedy by a competent judicial body[,]” and a claim to a right
to a remedy must be “determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities.” Id. para. C(c)(1)–(2).
124. 13th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, 1999–2000, 150, OAU Doc. AHG/222(XXXVI).
125. Id. para. 115–14.
126. Id. para. 81–82.
127. Id. para. 84.
128. Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
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extrajudicial killings,129 all three of which the Charter shields from prosecution.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
If the legal invalidity of the Charter is established under Algeria’s treaty obligations, academic literature reveals that a duty to prosecute under
customary international law is highly controversial, scholars
remaining near evenly split.130 Nevertheless, after examining a wide
129. See African Charter, supra, note 120, art. 4–7.
130. There are those who adopt the position that there is some form of an obligation to
prosecute under customary international law. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for
International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Searching
for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 9, 17–18 (1996) (asserting that the aut dedere aut judicare provision applies to
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and torture); Sadat, supra note 92,
at 1014–22 (suggesting that a custom against amnesties for jus cogens crimes may now
have come to fruition); Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?
5 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 21, 13, 15–16 (1994) (pointing to an emerging norm to prosecute
war crimes and crimes against humanity, and possibly disappearances and extrajudicial
murders as well, despite “inconclusive” state practice); Orentlicher, supra note 92,
at 2582–85 (maintaining that a custom requiring punishment of torture, extra-judicial
killings, and disappearances exists or is budding); O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 228–65
(arguing that state practice and opinio juris support an obligation to prosecute extra-legal
killings, genocide, torture, customary crimes, and those crimes under the jurisdiction of
the ICC); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94, at 489–505 (stating that there is a crystallizing
duty to investigate and “take action against” grave human rights violations and
advocating for an obligation to prosecute and investigate); Milena Sterio, Rethinking
Amnesty, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 391–94 (2006); William W. Burke-White,
Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of
Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 467, 529–30 (2001) (noting that amnesty laws
are legally invalid where they encompass war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
and torture).
Contrastingly, there is a sizeable group of scholars who maintain that a custom
requiring prosecution is either lacking and / or too unclear. See Roman Boed, The Effect
of Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators
of Serious Human Rights Violations, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 297, 314–18 (2000)
(concluding that although there is likely sufficient opinio juris, state practice prevents the
assertion that there is a customary duty to prosecute crimes against humanity); Kristin
Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law, 8 MSU-DCL J. INT’L L. 595,
626–28, 648 (1999) (acknowledging that while “international law does seem to be
moving the direction of prohibiting the grant of amnesty for international crimes,” if
certain measures are sufficiently provided for in the context of democratic transition,
even amnesty provisions covering international crimes might be acceptable); Dwight G.
Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a
Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293, 306–15 (2005) (holding that despite
“some trends in the progress of duties to prosecute . . . sources do not support the
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variety of sources, this section argues that such a duty does in fact exist
for the gravest of war crimes as well as crimes against humanity.
A. International Tribunals
According to the ICTY in the Furundzija case, torture’s jus cogens131
status has certain consequences, namely, that interstate acknowledgment
of national amnesty laws that protect perpetrators of torture “would not
be accorded international legal recognition.”132 This non-recognition is
based on the inconsistency of maintaining that “treaties or customary
rules providing for torture would be null and void ab initio, and then be
unmindful of a State say, taking national measures authorising or
condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators through an amnesty
law.”133
In “The Lomé Amnesty Decision,” the SCSL considered whether the
broad amnesty in the Lomé Agreement barred its jurisdiction over
international crimes.134 The SCSL found that it did have universal
jurisdiction based on the reasoning that “a state cannot sweep such
crimes into oblivion and forgetfulness . . . [as] the obligation to protect
human dignity is a peremptory norm and has assumed the nature of
obligation erga omnes.”135 However, the SCSL noted that a custom
prohibiting amnesty for international crimes “is developing,” rather than

incorporation of a generalized duty”); Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old
Atrocities, 87 GEO. L.J. 707, 726–29 (1999); Scharf, supra note 93, at 52–61 (arguing
that there is no custom requiring states to refrain from granting amnesty for crimes
against humanity); Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International
Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?,
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 191 (2002) (maintaining that “existing international law is vague
about the specifics of a state’s obligation to prosecute or punish,” but some type of
accountability is necessary for grave human rights violations); Trumbull, supra note 10,
at 290–303 (finding no custom legally invalidating amnesty laws, and asserting that even
though blanket amnesty laws might breach certain obligations, the scope of these
obligations is uncertain).
131. Jus cogens is “[a] mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law
accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004)
132. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, para. 155 (Dec. 10,
1998).
133. Id.
134. Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Case No. SCSL-200416-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, para 1, 65
(Mar. 13, 2004).
135. Id. para. 69, 71–72.
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fully formed.136 In the subsequent Kondewa case, contrastingly, Justice
Robertson addressed the customary status of amnesties at length in a
separate opinion, concluding that a rule does exist that “invalidates
amnesties offered under any circumstances to persons most responsible
for crimes against humanity (genocide and widespread torture) and the
worst war crimes (namely those in Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions).”137
B. Inter-American System
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“Inter-American Court”)
has long been at the forefront in framing the duties of states vis-à-vis
massive human rights violations. In its seminal case, Valásquez
Rodríguez, the court interpreted in now famous dicta the “respect” and
“ensure” language of the American Convention on Human Rights
(“American Convention”)138 to require states to “prevent, investigate and
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention.”139
With countless cases of human rights abuses brought before the
Inter-American System, amnesty laws have also come into consideration.
Not only the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“Inter-American Commission”), but also the Inter-American Court have
consistently declared the incompatibility of amnesty laws with
obligations under the American Convention. For example, in ruling on
Peru’s grant of amnesty to security forces and civilians for human rights
violations committed between 1980 and 1995, in the Barrios Altos Case,
the Inter-American Court asserted the following:

136. Id. para. 82. Duties erga omnes have been defined as “obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole. By their very nature [they] are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the right involved, all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection.” Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Co., Ltd. (Belg. V. Spain), 46 I.L.R. 178, 206 (I.C.J. 1970).
137. Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Separate Opinion of
Justice Robertson on the Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction / Abuse of Process: Amnesty
Provided by the Lomé Accord, para. 51 (May 25, 2004). Referring to Protocol II, Justice
Robertson reasoned, its amnesty provision “would apply to rank and file participants, but
not to authors of [armed] conflicts.” Id. para. 32. Acknowledging the existence of state
practice undermining a customary rule, Justice Robertson noted that this is at least
partially offset by “a hand-wringing quality about the excuses for amnesty by states
which grant them.” Id. para. 47.
138. American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 (Nov. 22, 1969) reprinted in OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev.12.
139. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at para. 166
(July 29, 1988).

2008]

ALGERIA'S AMNESTY LAW

1001

All amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the
establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are
inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and
punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations
such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and
forced disappearance.140

Likewise, the Inter-American Commission found amnesty laws in
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador as well as Uruguay to be in violation of the
American Convention, and reiterated a state’s duty to investigate,
prosecute and punish. 141
C. National Courts
Granting amnesty for acts and omissions “associated with political
objectives” provided that an applicant fully discloses relevant facts,
South Africa’s Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of
1995 was reviewed by the Constitutional Court of South Africa (“South

140. Barrios Altos Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, at para. 41 (Mar. 14,
2001). At least one scholar has suggested that this case does not establish a duty to
prosecute based on the Inter-American Court’s subsequent judgment in the case on
reparations. See Trumbull, supra note 10, at 301, n.96. It is important to note that Peru
stated in the initial decision before the Court that it would concede the violation of a right
to fair trial and judicial guarantees in failing to punish the crimes in question as well as
consider “the viability of criminal and administrative punishments.” Barrios Altos Case,
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, at para. 35 (Mar. 14, 2001). Moreover, the
Inter-American Commission recommended that Peru “punish those responsible for these
grave crimes, through the corresponding criminal procedure.” Id. para. 17. The Court’s
judgment on reparations actually does reference a duty to prosecute. With regard to
non-monetary reparations, the Inter-American Court unanimously ordered the application
of its judgment on the merits, which expressly set forth an obligation to “punish those
responsible.” In addition, in its original judgment, the Court found that Peru violated the
right to fair trial and judicial protection, “as a consequence of the enactment and
enforcement of [its two amnesty laws].” Barrios Altos Case, Judgement of November 30,
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 87, at para. 50(5)(a), 3(2)(c), 3(5) (Nov. 30, 2001).
And, both amnesty laws were passed in the middle of criminal court proceedings against
the perpetrators of the massacre in question. Id. para. 2(g)–(m).
141. E.g. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309 & 10.311, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. Report No. 28/92, OEA/ser. L/V/II.82, doc. 24, para. 40–41 (1992); Espinoza v.
Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 133/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6
rev. para. 64-67 (1999); Las Hojas v. El Salvador, Case 10.287, 1993 Inter-Am. C.H.R.
Report No. 26/92, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1992); Mendoza v. Uruguay, Cases
10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, & 10.375, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
Report No. 29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, para. 46, 50 (1992); Romero y Galdámez,
Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 37/00, OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3, rev. at
671, para. 4, 126, 129–31, 141, 158–59 (1999).
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African Court”) in the AZAPO Case.142 This body considered
international law only for the purposes of interpreting the South African
Constitution, which contained the Act in question, and deemed
“irrelevant” any duty to the contrary established by international law.143
Turning to the Geneva Conventions, the court found that the duty to
prosecute grave violations therein enshrined was inapplicable based on
the distinction between international and internal conflicts, South
Africa’s case belonging to the latter type.144 The court then bolstered this
presumption by arguably misinterpreting Protocol II as encouraging
national amnesties.145 And thus, the right to criminal prosecutions was
swiftly rejected.146
In contrast, in a 2004 decision, the supreme court of Chile denied the
application of Chile’s amnesty law to forced disappearances and
affirmed prison sentences for defendants found guilty of disappearing
persons in 1975.147 The court relied on the Inter-American Convention of
Forced Disappearances of Persons, even though this treaty was not
ratified by the country’s parliament, and unanimously declared that
forced disappearances constitute a crime against humanity to which no
statute of limitations applies.148 As the crime of disappearing individuals
is a continuing violation, the court found that the country’s amnesty law
shielding crimes perpetrated between 1973 and 1978 was inapplicable.149
Significantly, what the court did find binding were principles established

142. Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South
Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) (S. Afr.).
143. Id. para. 26.
144. Id. para. 29–30.
145. Id. para. 30–31. See supra Part II(b).
146. For criticism of South Africa’s decision not to prosecute and its Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, see for example Ziyad Motala, The Use of the Truth
Commission in South Africa as an Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism Versus the
International Law Obligations, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 913 (2005). See also, e.g., Olivia Lin, Demythologizing Restorative Justice: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts in Context, 12 ISLA J. INT’L & COMP L. 41
(2005) (questioning the uncompromising acceptance of restorative justice).
147. Supreme Court of Chile: Case of Miguel Angel Sandoval Rodríguez (November
17, 2004), American Society of International Law, International Law in Brief, Oct. 30,
2004, http://www.asil.org/ilib/2004/11/ilib041119.htm#j2 [hereinafter Rodriguez Case].
148. Id. Chile is not a party to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, http://www.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/ratification/6.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
149. Rodriguez Case, supra note 147.
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by the United Nations International Law Commission and given effect by
the Nuremberg Tribunal as well as the ICTY.150
The supreme court of Argentina went even further in its 2005 landmark
decision that struck down the country’s two amnesty laws as
unconstitutional.151 The court deemed disappearances a crime against
humanity with jus cogens status, thereby invalidating any statutory
limitations.152 Furthermore, even though Argentina ratified the American
Convention after the amnesty laws, the court established that the amnesty
laws prevented the state from satisfying its obligations under the treaty as
well as under established principles of international law, as both the
purpose and the effect of the amnesty laws were to bar prosecution.153 In
reaching this conclusion, the court closely drew from the jurisprudence
of the Inter-American Court, particularly the Barrios Altos Case.154
D. Regional Agreements
The monitoring bodies of the African Charter and the American
Convention have interpreted their instruments to establish a duty to prosecute human rights violations155 and both are widely ratified.156 In addi-

150. Id. As of December 2006, Chile has found more than 100 people guilty of crimes
including disappearances, murders, and torture, and 35 former generals are either
sentenced or to stand trial. Larry Rohter, Chile’s Leader Attacks Amnesty Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006.
151. Supreme Court of Argentina: Case of Julio Héctor Simon (Decision declaring
Argentina’s Amnesty Laws Unconstitutional) (June 14, 2005), American Society of
International Law, International Law in Brief, June 28, 2005, available at http://www.
asil.org/ilib/2005/06/ilib050628.htm.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. In June 2006, the first prosecution of a former official took place since the
invalidation of the amnesty laws. Two months later, the first conviction was issued; a
former police officer received twenty-five years for his participation in disappearing a
couple and their infant daughter. Joe Shaulis, Argentina Ex-President Testifies
Now-Annulled ‘Dirty War’ Amnesty Laws Needed, JURIST, Aug. 31, 2006, http://jurist.
law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/08/argentina-ex-president-testifies-now.php.
155. See supra Part II(e), Part III(b).
156. All fifty-three members of the African Union have ratified the African Charter.
Parties to African Charter, supra note 120. Twenty-five states are parties to the American
Convention. Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American
System, American Convention, Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications,
OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev.12 (Jan. 31, 2007). Nine states have yet to ratify this instrument,
including the United States, but, unlike international treaties, support for human rights
principles at a regional level does not require near unanimity. See RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW (THIRD): FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(c), cmt. 11
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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tion, while the European Court of Human Rights has read article 1157 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms158 as grounding a duty to prevent or remedy transgressions of
the treaty, the European Commission on Human Rights has construed it
as an obligation to prosecute criminally where suitable.159
E. U.N. Resolutions and Activities
In a 1973 General Assembly resolution, the following principle was
framed in obligatory language: “War crimes and crimes against humanity
. . . shall be subject to investigation and the persons against whom there
is evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to
tracing, arrest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment.”160
Resolutions on specific human rights crimes have also framed the duty
to prosecute and punish in mandatory terms. Regarding extra-judicial
killings, the Economic and Social Council passed a resolution in 1989
stating: “[I]n no circumstances, including a state of war, siege or other
public emergency, shall blanket immunity from prosecution be granted to
any person allegedly involved in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary
executions.”161 According to the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances adopted by the General
Assembly in 1992, alleged perpetrators of disappearances “shall not benefit from any special amnesty law or similar measures that might have
the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings or sanction.”162 And concerning torture, in a 1999 resolution, the
Commission on Human Rights declared: “[T]hose who encourage, order,

157. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Nov. 4, 1950).
158. There are forty-six parties to this instrument. European Court of Human Rights,
Basic Texts, Dates of Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Additional Protocols, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
159. Yasmin Naqvi, Amnesty for War Crimes: Defining the Limits of International
Recognition, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 583, 607 (2003).
160. Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res.
3074 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78 para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973) (adopted with ninety-four in favor, none against, and twenty-nine abstentions)
[hereinafter Principles of International Co-operation].
161. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Res. 1989/65, para. 19, U.N.
ESCOR Supp. No. 1 at 52, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (May 24, 1989).
162. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, G.A.
Res. 47/133, art. 18, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/47/49 (Dec. 18,
1992) (adopted without a vote).
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tolerate or perpetrate [torture] must be held responsible and severely
punished.”163
Furthermore, the 1997 final report prepared by the Special Rapporteur
on Amnesty provided that “[e]ven when intended to establish conditions
conducive to a peace agreement or to foster national reconciliation,
amnesty and other measures of clemency shall be kept within the
following bounds,” which provide, inter alia, “perpetrators of serious
crimes under international law may not benefit from such measures
until”164 the state has “prosecuted, tried, and duly punished [them]”.165
Over the past few decades, numerous other resolutions and statements
have been made to the same effect.166
163. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Commission on Human Rights [CHR] Res. 1999/32, para. 4, CHR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1999/32 (Apr. 23, 1999).
164. Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations
(Civil and Political): Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to
Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, CHR, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 49th Sess., princ. 25(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1997).
165. Id. princ. 18.
166. Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2712 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. at 78, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (“[c]all[ing] upon all states to take
measures . . . to arrest such persons and extradite them . . . so that they can be brought to
trial and punished”) (adopted with fifty-five in favor, four against, and thirty-three
abstentions); RESTATEMENT, § 702, cmt. b (asserting that a state violates customary
international law “if [the enumerated jus cogens human rights violations], especially by
its officials, have been repeated or notorious and no steps have been taken to prevent
them or to punish the perpetrators”); S.C. Res. 827, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May
25, 1993) (unanimously founding the ICTY “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law”); Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, para. 60, 62, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (July 12, 1993)
(“States should abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave
violations of human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations . . . [I]t is the
duty of all States, under any circumstances . . . if allegations are confirmed [that an
enforced disappearance has taken place], to prosecute its perpetrators.”); S.C. Res. 955,
para 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR towards the same
end as that of the ICTY); Rome Statute, infra note 204, at pmbl. (“[r]ecalling that it
is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes”); Impunity, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2002/79,
para. 11, U.N. CHR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/79 (Apr. 25, 2002)
(“urg[ing] all States to take effective measures to implement their obligations to
prosecute or extradite perpetrators of [crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and torture]”).
Recent statements by U.N. officials adopt the same position against such
amnesties. In addition to truth and reconciliation commissions, according to the
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While these positions against amnesties for war crimes and crimes
against humanity are highly significant, the U.N. has at times either
assisted in negotiating such amnesties or offered tacit approval.
Examples of the former include peace agreements in Haiti (1993) and
South Africa (1994), and an instance of the latter involves a response to
El Salvador’s amnesty law (1993).167 It is important to note, however,
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations: “‘[W]e must also ensure that any
amnesty clauses in peace agreements exclude amnesties for war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity and other serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law.’” Press Release, Working Justice Systems Vital for UN Peacekeeping
Success, Security Council Told (Sept. 30, 2003). The Secretary-General also asserted that
resolutions and mandates should “[r]eject any endorsement of amnesty for genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity.” The Secretary-General, Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies, para. 64(c), delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23,
2004). Addressing the Security Council, the U.N. Legal Counsel maintained: “Justice
should never be sacrificed by granting amnesty in ending conflicts . . . [A]mnesty for
international crimes [is] now considered unacceptable in international practice.” Press
Release, Justice Must Not Be Sacrificed to End Conflicts, Security Council Told (June
22, 2006).
167. Trumbull, supra note 10, at 293–94. Although Trumbull also cites a U.N. implicit
endorsement of Guatemala’s amnesty law, this case should be excluded from the above
category, as Guatemala’s law was not designed to encompass war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or torture. See Annual Report, Guatemala, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.95, doc. 7 rev., para. 30 (1996).
The 1996 Abidjan Accord amnestied the acts of the Revolutionary United Front
of Sierra Leone. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, art. 14 (Nov. 30, 1996). Nonetheless, the case of Sierra Leone ultimately warrants exclusion, as the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General added a statement to his signature of the Lomé
Accord, asserting “that the UN holds the understanding that the amnesty provisions of the
Agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.” S.C. Res.
1315, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (affirming unanimously). The
Security Council itself then “reaffirm[ed] further that persons who commit or authorize
serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and
accountable for those violations.” Id. Pursuant to this resolution, the amended Statute of
the SCSL expressly provides: “[A]n amnesty granted to any person falling within the
jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of
the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.” Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, art. 10, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145.
Finally, U.N. involvement in Liberia should not be so easily construed in favor of
amnesties. Signed by a U.N. representative, the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ending hostilities in Liberia included a vague provision leaving open the possibility of a
general amnesty. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia
and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, art. 34, signed Aug. 18, 2003,
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that these U.N. endorsements took place over a decade ago, and more
recent positions should also be considered, which suggest greater
continuity between U.N. principles and practice regarding amnesties.168
In March 2007, in a report delivered to the Security Council, the
Secretary General reminded President Hamid Karzai that his Action Plan
on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation must not bar from prosecution genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or gross human rights violations.169 Similarly, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in May
2007, advised the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army
to ground their peace agreement in international legal standards, relaying: “‘[T]here can be no amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and gross violations of human rights.’”170 And as recently
as July 2007, the U.N. stated that it would boycott East Timor’s Commission of Truth and Friendship if the body did not amend its terms of
reference to exclude amnesty for genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and gross human rights violations.171

available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_cpa.html. Despite
this, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (“UNMIL”) was subsequently established via
a Security Council resolution, which “stresse[d] the need to bring to justice those
responsible [for human rights violations and atrocities].” S.C. Res. 1509, para. 10, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003) (adopted unanimously). In November 2005, the
Security Council passed an additional resolution that, in the event of Charles Taylor’s
return to Liberia, UNMIL was mandated to “transfer him or facilitate his transfer
to Sierra Leone for prosecution.” S.C. Res. 1638, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1638 (Nov.
11, 2005) (adopted unanimously).
168. See also Acte d’Engagement, infra note 192.
169. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security, para. 79, delivered
to the Security Counsel and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2007/152, A/61/799
(Mar. 15, 2007).
170. Press Release, UN Official Urges Ugandan Parties to Put Human Rights at Centre
of Talks (May 11, 2007).
171. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Says U.N. Officials Will Not
Testify at Timor-Leste Commission, As Terms of Reference Include Possible Amnesty
for Human Rights Violations, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/11101 (July 26, 2007).
Regarding Algeria specifically, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Yakin Ertürk, issued a recent report on women in Algeria that recommended
“adopt[ing] a zero tolerance policy towards all forms of violence against women and girls
and diligently record, investigate and prosecute all cases.” Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk,
U.N. Human Rights Council, 70th Sess., Agenda Item 3, para. 104(a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
7/6/Add.2 (2008). The report specified that “all identified perpetrators of sexual violence
should be exempted from amnesty and brought to justice.” Id. para. 104(b).
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F. State Practice
Against this abundance of judicial decisions, treaties, resolutions, and
statements supporting a duty to prosecute war crimes, crimes against
humanity, gross human rights violations, genocide and torture, in the past
twenty-five years, numerous countries have issued amnesties for such
crimes, including: Afghanistan,172 Argentina,173 Cambodia,174 Chile,175
Colombia,176 El Salvador,177 Haiti,178 Honduras,179 Lebanon,180
Mauritania,181 Peru,182 Sierra Leone,183 South Africa,184 Uganda,185 and
Uruguay.186 Some of the provisions of these laws, though, are more
tailored in procedure and scope.187 Nevertheless, what these cases share
172. Ron Synovitz, Afghanistan: Amnesty Law Draws Criticism, Praise,
Eurasia Insight, Mar. 17, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp
0317.7.shtml.
173. Supra Part III(b)–(c).
174. Ronald C. Slye, The Cambodian Amnesties: Beneficiaries and the Temporal
Reach of Amnesties for Gross Violation of Human Rights, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 99, 101–03
(2004).
175. Supra Part III(b)–(c).
176. Juan Forero, New Colombia Law Grants Concession to Paramilitaries, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2005.
177. Supra Part III(b).
178. Haitians Vote Amnesty But Terms Are Vague, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994.
179. Honduras: Continued Struggle Against Impunity, Amnesty International,
Mar. 27, 1996, 4, http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR370011996ENGLISH/$File/
AMR3700196.pdf [hereinafter Struggle Against Impunity].
180. Amnesty Ratified in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1991.
181. 13th Activity Report of the ACHPR, supra note 124.
182. Supra Part III(b).
183. Supra Part III(a).
184. Supra Part III(a).
185. The Amnesty Act, 2000, art. 3, Conciliation Resources, Our Work, Accord,
Northern Uganda, Additional Keytexts, www.c-r.org (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). In
February 2008, the Ugandan government and Lord’s Resistance Army / Movement
signed an annex agreement that provides for the creation of a special domestic court to
prosecute “serious crimes” perpetrated during Uganda’s conflict. How this agreement
will affect the Amnesty Act and the extent to which “traditional justice mechanisms” will
influence or supplement the court’s proceedings remains to be seen. Annexure to the
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation art. 7, 9–14, 23, Feb. 19, 2008,
http://mediacentre.go.ug/uploads/Signed%20Annexure%20to%20Agreement%20on%2
0Accountability%20and%20Reconciliation.19.02.08%20_1_.pdf.
186. Supra Part III(b).
187. For example, the amnesty law adopted in February 2007 in Afghanistan bars the
state from bringing prosecutions for war crimes on its own initiative, but acknowledges
victims’ legal right to seek justice by allowing them to bring complaints against parties.
Synovitz, supra note 172. The “Justice and Peace Law” in Colombia offers reduced
sentences to crimes committed by armed groups, which encompass gross human rights
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is a dearth of opinio juris, from which state practice must stem.188 A key
question is whether states adopting amnesty laws can be considered to
have done so out of a sense of legal obligation when the driving force
behind their passage is a fraught or forced attempt to secure public
order.189 These situations have been likened to duress, undermining the
relative value of this practice as a manifestation of state-perceived rights
and duties.190 This observation holds true for most, if not all of these
amnesty laws.191
violations. Annual Report, Columbia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev.
1, para. 14 (2006); Annual Report, Colombia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124,
doc. 5, para. 14, 17 (2005).
188. Opinio juris, short for opinio juris sive necessitates, signifies “from a sense of
legal obligations.” RESTATEMENT § 102, cmt. c.
189. Illustratively, in response to the HRC’s appraisal of the Charter, the Algerian
government stated that the Charter “is a political text and should not, therefore, elicit
comment from a legal body.” Characterizing the Charter as an expression of “the
unanimous will of the Algerian people,” the government then asserted that the Charter
and accompanying decrees do not “favour impunity or amnesty.” U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Comments by the Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria
to the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, para. 1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/DZA/CO/3/Add.1 (2007).
190. See, e.g., O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 262–63. For evidence that Uruguay, Chile, El
Salvador, and the United States have acknowledged the importance of prosecuting human
rights violations, see Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94, at 496–98. But see Scharf, supra note
93, at 58–59.
191. O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 262–63. States have diplomatically recognized other
countries’ amnesty laws. For example, the United States, France and the European Union
backed the Charter based ostensibly on its accompanying referendum. Infra note 268.
However, one encounters the same problem in assessing whether this recognition follows
from opinio juris, a problem that is especially attenuated given that policy considerations,
not a legal understanding of humanitarian and human rights principles, may be the
overriding factor in issuing approval. See, e.g., id. Guidelines for assessing customary
human rights law serve to downplay the importance of this particular evidence of custom.
According to the Restatement: “[O]ther states are only occasionally involved in monitoring [international human rights] law through ordinary diplomatic practice. Therefore, the
practice of states that is accepted as building customary international law of human rights
includes some forms of conduct different from those that build customary international
law generally.” RESTATEMENT § 701, note 2. The Restatement then proceeds to elaborate
upon forms of conduct specific to human rights law. Importantly, the consequence of
diplomatic practice towards other states is limited to the following: “invocation of human
rights principles in national policy, in diplomatic practice, in international organization
activities and actions; and other diplomatic communications or action by states reflecting
the view that certain practices violate international human rights law, including condemnation and other adverse state reactions to violations by other states.” Id. Compare, id.,
with id. § 102, cmt. b. In the case of Algeria, for example, neither of the above affirmations of the Charter holds weight, as they respectively invoked principles of democracy,
not those of human rights, and affirmed rather than criticized the state’s practice.
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Furthermore, two recent instances of state practice demonstrate a
commitment to respecting a duty to prosecute when amnesty laws are
negotiated and ratified. In January 2008, the Democratic Republic of
Congo and several armed groups within the country signed a peace
agreement that expressly excludes from a prospective amnesty law war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed from June
2003 to the present.192 Additionally, Iraq’s parliament passed a
U.S.-backed amnesty law in February 2008 that precludes its application
to persons convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
genocide.193
There is also a closely related trend of amnesty laws functioning as
stopgaps, where amnestied violations are prosecuted years later at less
harrowing junctures. In 1996, the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights
in Honduras indicted ten military officers for the 1982 attempted murder
and unlawful detention of six students. The officers argued that they
were immune from prosecution under the 1991 amnesty law, an
argument the country’s supreme court unanimously rejected.194
Beginning in the late 1990s, courts in Chile exploited loopholes in the

192. Acte d’Engagement art., 4(1), Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.rfi.fr/radiofr/images/097/
Actedengagement_Goma080123.pdf. Significantly, this act was negotiated by the United
Nations, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, United States, African
Union, and European Union, and all five parties emphasized article 4, which provides for
the exclusion in question. Id. pmbl.
193. Qānūn al-’afū al-’ām, art. 2(a), Feb. 17, 2008, http://parliament.iq/Iraqi_Council_
of_Representatives.php?name=articles_ajsdyawqwqdjasdba46s7a98das6dasda7das4da6d
8asdsawewqeqw465e4qweq4wq6e4qw8eqwe4qw6eqwe4sadkj&file=showdetails&sid=4
31; Statute of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, art.1(2), Oct. 18, 2005. For an English
translation of the “General Amnesty Law,” see Travis Sharp, Full Text of Iraq’s Recenty
Passed Amnesty Law, Iraq Insider, Mar. 7, 2008, http://theiraqinsider.blogspot.com/
2008/03/full-text-of-iraqs-recently-passed.html.
Albeit more modest, regarding impunity more generally, another example of state
practice indirectly supporting a duty to prosecute is President Jose Ramos Horta of Timor
Leste’s request that the East Timor Court of Appeals issue an opinion on whether a
pardon passed by East Timor’s parliament is constitutional and violates the state’s
international obligations. This law could shield perpetrators of a range of crimes, such as
firearms offenses, crimes against security, and larceny, committed between April 2006
and April 2007. Timor Crime Law Goes to Court, THE AGE, July 4, 2007,
http://www.theage.com; Anselmo Lee, Open Letter to President Jose Ramos-Horta on
Impunity and Rights Violations, Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific,
June 21, 2007, http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/statements/2007/forumasia_openletter
tojoseramos-horta_210607.htm.
194. Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 179, at 5–6. It appears, however, that
subsequent threats from the military thwarted these efforts towards accountability. See
SRIRAM, infra note 209, at 42.
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state’s amnesty law in order to prosecute disappearances.195 Argentina
has been fully active in its prosecutions since 2005.196 In 2005, a
Peruvian judge ordered the arrest of more than 100 military officers
implicated in a 1988 massacre, and historically, in September 2007, Peru’s ex-president Alberto Fujimori was transferred from Chile to Peru,
where he will stand trial before the country’s supreme court for
authorizing murders.197 Likewise, in late 2006, a Uruguayan court
charged eight former police and military officers with kidnapping and
conspiracy related to disappearances and overturned as unconstitutional
pardons for two of the accused.198
G. A Customary Duty to Prosecute
To synthesize the evidence analyzed, robust opinio juris against
amnesties for universal crimes is found in international, regional,
national judicial decisions199 as well as administrative opinions, with the

195. Rohter, supra note 150.
196. Most recently, for example, the courts are poised to criminally try the country’s
ex-president for human rights violations during the Dirty War. James M. Yoch, Jr.,
Argentina Ex-President to Face Trial for Alleged ‘Dirty War’ Rights Abuses, JURIST,
Mar. 22, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/03/argentina-ex-president-toface-trial.php.
197. Howard Kline, Peru Ex-President Fujimori Facing Four Trials Starting in
November, JURIST, Oct. 6, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/10/peru-expresident-fujimori-facing-four.php.
198. Lisl Brunner, Uruguay Indicts 8 for Operation Condor Disappearances,
JURIST, Sept. 12, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/09/uruguay-indicts-8for-operation-condor.php.
After or during periods of transition, within the last few decades, countries
without amnesty laws have also prosecuted international crimes in their national courts.
For example, in 1975, Greece commenced criminal trials against the junta, which
overthrew the government in 1967 and carried out torture and arbitrary arrests. (Greece
pronounced an “amnesty,” however it covered political crimes and did not apply to
crimes of the junta.) SRIRAM, infra note 209, at 49–50. After the Bolivian congress
brought charges in 1986 against members of the security forces, military, and junta, as
well as General Luis Garcia Meza, who ruled from 1980–1981, the supreme court
ultimately convicted defendants of torture, arbitrary detention, and murder. Though the
general became a fugitive, eleven of the guilty were imprisoned. Id. at 47. Border guards
were convicted in the early nineties for shooting at East Germans who attempted to flee
the country, and in 1997 several ex-officials were found guilty on similar charges. Id. at
55–56. Also, a number of convictions were issued against members of security forces in
Sri Lanka for disappearances. Id. at 70.
199. “In determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial weight is
accorded to: (a) judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral tribunals;
(b) judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals.” RESTATEMENT § 103(2).

1012

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 33:3

limited exception of the South African Court.200 These are matched by
widely supported General Assembly resolutions201 and plentiful U.N.
reports and official statements. With regard to state practice, numerous
states have passed amnesty laws for serious international crimes, but this
pattern is largely undercut by a lack of requisite opinio juris. And states
have either repealed, in whole or in part, amnesty laws covering such
breaches, and several have begun or attempted to prosecute amnestied
crimes.
It is important to confront the bugaboo of this operation: State
practice.202 Based on its relative frailty, critics have often dismissed the
argument that a duty to prosecute exists as merely aspirational.
Nevertheless, these dismissals fail to take into account the very nature of
public humanitarian law and human rights law, which have traditionally
relied upon opinio juris in order to accommodate normative concerns
unique to these bodies of law.203 Even though a practice of prosecuting
200. The Lomé Amnesty Decision is complex, as the SCSL generally rejected
amnesties for international crimes, but maintained that the amnesty in question did not
serve as a bar primarily based upon the jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it by statute,
leaving it up to the national court to decide whether to accept the amnesty for
jurisdictional purposes. Thus, when the SCSL noted that a customary norm against such
amnesties was crystallizing, this should not be construed as opinio juris against these
laws per se. Rather, it was more a reluctant declaration on the general status of custom.
See supra Part III(a).
201. For example, General Assembly resolution 3074 was passed by a unanimous vote
of ninety-four, with twenty-nine abstentions. Principles of International Co-operation,
supra note 160. Those abstaining could have openly voted against the resolution, but
chose not to, which suggests an extreme uneasiness towards not supporting an affirmative
duty to prosecute and punish war crimes and crimes against humanity. Moreover, as
backing for U.N. resolutions requires “general support,” RESTATEMENT § 701, note 2.,
this vote satisfies the threshold for inclusion as custom.
202. There has been significant tension between what has been identified as “modern”
and “traditional” custom. If the former prioritizes opinio juris, thereby allowing custom
to come into being more rapidly, the latter prioritizes state practice, thereby retarding the
speed at which custom is realized. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L
L. 757, 758–60 (2001). This Note relies upon the Restatement, which exhibits greater
sensitivity to human rights and is widely supported in its more flexible approach. See,
e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 8–14, n.72 (1995).
203. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), para. 183–209, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). See, e.g.,
Frederic J. Kirgis, Jr., Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v. United States
(Merits), 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 149 (1987) (maintaining that while a customary analysis
favoring opinio juris might seem incoherent with the more traditional emphasis on state
practice, this discrepancy can be explained by reference to a sliding scale, positing that
the relative weight of either element is based upon “the activity in question and on the
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international crimes is modest, it is nonetheless existent and the tendency
of states to pass amnesty laws should not outweigh near unanimous opinio juris. It is therefore wholly appropriate to assert a duty to
prosecute the most serious war crimes204 and crimes against humanity,
which represent the severest classes of violations.
Turning to policy issues, it has been argued that the sheer scale of
potential prosecutions to be brought after armed conflicts makes any duty
to prosecute unmanageable, especially given the limited strength and
independence of the judiciaries in many if not most of the states
experiencing such struggles.205 This position, however, spawns an
intolerable paradox: The more pervasive the atrocities, the less
accountability may be demanded. If a state does not have sufficient
capacity to handle prosecutions, it is all the more reason to support the
development of appropriate mechanisms,206 not to make concessions to a
fundamentally deficient status quo. Likewise, allowing states to excuse
reasonableness of the asserted customary rule”); Joshua Ratner, Back to the Future: Why
a Return to the Approach of the Filartiga Court is Essential to Preserve the Legitimacy
and Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 117-119
(supporting the Filartiga approach, and asserting that the decision “implied that, at least
in terms of the [customary international law] of human rights, official state
pronouncements were of greater evidentiary significance than reports of contrary state
practice”); John Tasioulas, In Defense of Normative Relativity: Communitarian Values
and the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 85 (1996) (arguing in support of
the Nicaragua approach and noting that “a clearly demonstrated opinio juris may
establish a norm despite a lack of general state practice consistent with the putative
norm”). But see Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J.
INT’L L. 101 (1987) (criticizing Nicaragua). See also, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 113 (1991) (“The burden of
proof to be discharged in establishing custom in the field of human or humanitarian rights
is . . . less onerous than in other fields of international law.”).
204. Namely, these are found in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. As
accordingly set forth in the Rome Statute, such crimes include the following: “violence to
life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”;
“committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment”; “taking of hostages”; “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.” Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.83/9 (July
17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. For concision, “war crimes” will hereinafter be
used to refer to these violations only.
205. Ratner, supra note 130, at 719–20. To an extent, prosecutorial discretion will
provide relief by limiting judicial scope. There is the danger that this discretion will be
used to accomplish victors’ justice, but this may be offset by the principle that those most
responsible for the abuses should be prosecuted. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 92, at
2601–03.
206. See Extradite or Prosecute Report, supra note 98.
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themselves based on scarce state resources207 and the expense of criminal
trials is a failure to invest in the rule of law in cases where it matters
most.
A duty to prosecute must also confront situations in which an amnesty
law is considered the only viable way of ending violence.208 Based on
this dilemma, it has been proposed that in order to form a more nuanced
customary rule towards amnesties, striking a balance “between” justice
and peace,209 recognition of an amnesty law should be partially
determined by whether the legislation “is reasonably necessary to end the
hostilities.”210 This criterion is quite fair. If a general rule accommodated
this factor, however, what will prevent states from timing the legislation
of amnesty laws to coincide with what appear to be alleviating
circumstances giving rise to an exception? Hopefully, there will also
come a time when the state enjoys relative stability within the same
generation. Is it then appropriate to maintain support for an active
amnesty law when it is no longer justified on this initial prescribed basis?
This question closely relates to the further quandary that prosecutions
will shatter a fragile peace, destabilizing a country, as those in power or
those who have relinquished power but still exert extreme pressure on
the government are more often than not implicated in the crimes to be
207. See Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at para. 42–49 (S. Afr.) (including this argument in
its section on civil remedies).
208. It is not wholly clear whether a general duty to prosecute is necessarily disadvantageous in this context. A state might be able to drive a hard bargaining line by offering
insurgents a choice between a possible commuting of punishment and a maximum
sentence, rather than between criminal impunity and continued battle. This would hinge
on whether those fighting prefer the risk of maintaining the struggle to the near certainty
of some criminal punishment. Also, there would then arise the issue of to what extent a
state could commute a given sentence, as in principle punishment must appropriately
reflect the gravity of the offense committed. While there are difficulties surrounding the
compatibility of prosecutions and ending recurrent violence, there are also hurdles
involved in brokering a peace deal that amnesties war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as any peace process relies on the assumption that those involved favor peace
to sustaining conflict. Favoring the latter is tragically all too easy; this choice follows
from entrenched convictions rooted in the very causes giving rise to violence in the first
place. See infra Conclusion.
209. See Bassiouni, supra note 130, at 11–13 (calling into question justice and peace
being framed as a dichotomy). For a valuable case study that closely examines states in
transition in order to analyze patterns affecting the capacity for accountability and that
maintains peace and justice are not opposed, but rather exist along a continuum, see
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE AND
PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION (2004).
210. See Trumbull, supra note 10, at 316–19, 325–27 (arguing for a three-part
balancing test, involving process, substance and circumstances).

2008]

ALGERIA'S AMNESTY LAW

1015

prosecuted. Considering the balance of power to assist in the
determination of whether an amnesty law should be supported is reasonable,211 but it is not unproblematic. Incorporation of this factor into a
legal rule would persistently stamp out state practice.212 Virtually all
states that have amnestied war crimes or crimes against humanity have
suffered from political and civil instability when these laws were passed.
And again, must it be accepted that the right to demand accountability is
forever denied because an amnesty law coincided with a transition
towards general welfare, even if power has since shifted to offer the
opportunity for fair prosecutions?
The two criteria referenced above—whether amnesty laws are
reasonably required to stop conflicts, and whether state balance of power
necessitates their adoption—are essentially dilutions of the necessity
defense in international law.213 Although such elements can certainly be
incorporated into the content of the rule itself, this would thereby
preclude the application of this tailored extraordinary defense,214 which
raises cause for concern. The purpose of the necessity defense’s “strict
limitations [is] to safeguard against possible abuse,”215 which, it has been
suggested, is precisely the danger these two propositions present.
If ending impunity is to be considered a fundamental universal interest
worthy of being furthered, it is crucial to have a strong rule, rather than a
211. See Arnould, supra note 10, at 230–31 (setting aside legal considerations to
analyze whether the Charter is justified on the basis of two factors taken from Sriram’s
study). Sriram, however, identifies these factors to inform whether accountability can be
achieved, not whether it should be sought. SRIRAM, supra note 209, at 20–33, 203.
212. While this might seem circular, skeptics of a general duty to prosecute do not
generally base their objections on the normative desirability of such a rule, but rather on
its practical ramifications for developing nations. See, e.g., Trumbull, supra note 10
(formulating criteria towards channeling possibly emergent state practice against amnesty
laws).
213. To invoke a successful necessity defense in international law, a state must prove
that the wrongful act “is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril” and “does not seriously impair an essential interest of
the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community
as a whole.” And necessity may not be invoked where the wrongful act violates a jus
cogens norm, or where “the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.” International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts With Commentaries, art. 25, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. For a recent appraisal, see Sarah F. Hill,
The “Necessity Defense” and the Emerging Arbitral Conflict in it Application to the
U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 547, 549–57
(2007) (supporting the Draft Articles while acknowledging criticisms).
214. The examples provided in the Draft Articles include humanitarian intervention
and military necessity. See Draft Articles, supra note 213, art. 25, cmt. 20.
215. Id. art. 25, cmt. 2.
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more specific norm that creates loopholes from its very inception. Where
a state explicitly or tacitly uses criminal immunity as an indispensable
political bargaining chip in negotiating peace agreements or beneficial
transfers of power, a near inevitable reality, and then enshrines this
immunity in an amnesty law covering war crimes or crimes against
humanity, such law should be treated as a breach, not a customary
exception based on expediency.216 Otherwise, a legal basis for exerting
pressure on states to prosecute and supporting those within a state who
do seek justice will be continually lost,217 which is especially
troublesome when the arguable “costs” of justice no longer outweigh any
“benefits” of peace. This rule is neither radical nor novel. It essentially
parallels the approach of the CAT and HRC,218 African Commission,219
and Inter-American System.220
Although it could be maintained that the presence of a clear obligation
will undermine any leverage criminal immunity may possess, this is an
overstatement in the majority of cases. A general duty to prosecute is
unlikely to pose much of a new threat to perpetrators. When national
prosecutions for amnestied international crimes have actually taken
place, it is only years later, and only after extremely persistent efforts are
paired with opportune circumstances. Also, given the flexibility
prosecutorial discretion provides a state, those who stand to lose might
be correct in assessing the chances of a criminal suit being brought as
slim. Lastly, even without an obligation to prosecute, there is always
some menace of accountability. National amnesty laws in certain
circumstances do not bar jurisdiction in foreign state courts over crimes
against humanity, genocide, and torture,221 and the ICC prosecutor may
choose not to accept a state’s amnesty law.222 More importantly, the fear
among perpetrators that states might not forever abide by their amnesty
laws may always remain to some degree, given the frequent unpopularity
of these laws and their groundings on power balances, which are subject
to shift.
The peace agreements in question, admittedly, present some further
difficulty. If foreign states or the U.N. participate in negotiations leading
to an amnesty for war crimes or crimes against humanity, there is the
216. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing
Accountability Over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 191 (2003).
217. See Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 2547–48.
218. See supra Part II(c)–(d).
219. See supra Part II(e).
220. See supra Part III(b).
221. Boed, supra note 130.
222. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 17(1)(b), 17(2)(a).
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danger of losing credibility. Parties to peace agreements may require
arbiters to commit on paper to such legally compromising terms. One
option is to concede the illegal provisions, when absolutely necessary,
but append a disclaimer, as the U.N. official did in the case of the Lomé
Accords. This might be considered a superficial response, but the danger
of realpolitik is precisely why international law is formed not only by
what states do and say, but also by opinio juris.
IV. ALGERIA AND THE DUTY TO PROSECUTE
Algeria is thus confronted with two sets of legal obligations. While the
Charter breaches those established by treaty,223 does it amnesty war
crimes and crimes against humanity, thereby contravening the general
duty to prosecute? This section suggests that the Charter extinguishes
liability for both categories of crimes. Furthermore, prosecuting these
violations would be in keeping with the desires of a considerable number
of Algerians whose lives these violations have affected.
A. The Charter: Amnestying War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
The Charter unquestionably amnesties war crimes.224 Encompassing
disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings,225 war crimes must

223. In Algeria, international and regional agreements are accorded a higher status
than domestic law: “Treaties ratified by the President of the Republic in accordance
with the conditions provided for by the Constitution are superior to the law.”
CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE ALGÉRIENNE DÉMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE [Constitution] ch. 2, art. 132 (Alg.). The country’s Constitutional Council embraced this provision
in a 1989 decision, which stated: “[A]fter its ratification and publication, every convention is integrated into national law and through application of article 123 [sic] of the constitution, acquires a superior authority to the law, allowing every Algerian citizen to
claim it in front of the courts.” Décision n° 1-D-L-CC-89 of 20 août 1989 relative au
code electoral, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.dz/indexFR.htm (author’s
translation).
224. War crimes and crimes against humanity may take place within an internal armed
conflict, and thus non-state actors are responsible. William A. Schabas, Theoretical and
International Framework: Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed
Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 907, 918–22 (2003). See also, Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,
G.A. Res. 2391, art. 2, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 18, 23d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Nov. 26,
1968); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (1995) (setting forth that non-state actors
may violate war crimes and genocide).
The armed groups in Algeria satisfy the non-state actor requirements of Protocol
II, as “under responsible command, [they] exercise[d] such control over a part of
[Algeria’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations[.]” Protocol II, supra note 83, art. 1. They also fall under the less stringent
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have been carried out against civilians.226 In addition, they must have
taken place within the context of an “armed conflict,” which has been
defined by the ICTY in Tadic as “protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State.”227 As violence by armed groups broke out in
Algeria towards the end of 1992 and the regime was soon after unable to
put a stop to their daily attacks,228 by definition, armed conflict began at
this juncture. The point of commencement appears clear enough, but has
the armed conflict ended, and if so, when? Again, according to the
ICTY: “[I]nternational humanitarian law . . . extends beyond the
cessation of hostilities until . . . a peaceful settlement is achieved.”229
While violence between the regime and insurgency noticeably declined
by 1999230 and many members of armed groups have laid down their
weapons, it is quite difficult to conclude that a “peaceful settlement” has
in fact occurred when fatal clashes and bomb attacks have persisted.231
Thus, war crimes involve the period from late 1992 through the present.
Post-1992, particular Islamist factions at different times abducted,
tortured,232 and murdered civilians.233 And it has been extensively
documented that state security forces committed all three of the above
crimes against non-combatants.234
Considerably more complex by definition, crimes against humanity
introduce a series of necessary elements, ensuring that their intended
superlative severity is preserved.235 This category of crimes has been
definition of non-state actors in the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art.
8(2)(f).
225. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 8(2)(c).
226. These are “persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part
in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted.” Protocol II, supra note 83,
art. 4(1). The term “civilian” will hereinafter be referred to in this sense.
227. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
228. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 186–88.
229. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
230. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 261.
231. See infra notes 302–306 and accompanying text.
232. Fear and Silence, supra note 38, at 24; Smith, infra note 294.
233. See infra Part IV(a).
234. See infra Part IV(a).
235. This class of crimes appears in various permutations in the Nuremberg Charter as
well as the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, SCSL, and Iraqi Higher Criminal Court
(“IHCC”). Compare Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the
Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of
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most recently set forth in the Rome Statute,236 and may include the acts
amnestied by the Charter.237 Crimes against humanity are defined in the
Rome Statute as any of the enumerated acts when (1) “committed as part
of a widespread or systematic,” (2) “attack directed against any civilian
population,” (3) “with knowledge of the attack.”238 The second factor
further requires a state or organizational policy.239
Enforced disappearances are inherently such crimes when committed
on a widespread or systematic basis.240 As this requirement is framed in
the disjunctive, “widespread” alone is sufficient241 and has been defined
as “massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of

Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c),
Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, art. 3, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994); Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
art. 10, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145; Statute of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, art.
12, Dec. 10, 2003. For exploration of the development of crimes against humanity, see
Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73, 77–91 (2004); Simon
Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against
Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307, 308–14 (2000); Phyllis Hwang, Defining
Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 22
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457 (1998); Darryl Robinson, Developments in International
Criminal Law: Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 43, 44–45 (1999).
236. The definition of crimes against humanity is near identical in the ICC and IHCC
statutes. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7, with Statute of the Iraqi Higher
Criminal Court, art. 12, Dec. 10, 2003.
237. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7(1)(a), 7(1)(f), 7(1)(i) (murder, torture, and
enforced disappearances, respectively).
238. Id. art. 7(1).
239. An “attack directed against any civilian population” is defined as a “course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack.” Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. (7)(2)(a).
240. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance art. 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/WP.1/REV.4 (Sept. 23, 2005)
[hereinafter Convention on Disappearance].
241. “Systematic basis” is presently harder to demonstrate in this case. It must be
“pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy.” Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind With Commentaries, art. 18, cmt. 3, in Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eight Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at 14, UN Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
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victims.”242 With no less than 6146 Algerians disappeared by the state,243
the scale of the missing was one of the worst in the last decade of the
twentieth century.244 These acts were widespread, and therefore are
crimes against humanity. Concerning armed groups, it is unlikely that the
many abductions they carried out245 fit the definition of “enforced
disappearances”246 because these groups were not “political
organizations” in the usual sense of the term; rather, they were highly
fractured entities composed of various informal cells that worked under
distinct local leadership.247 Quite probably, most victims who were
abducted were shortly thereafter murdered. There were, however, cases
of armed groups holding women captive in their camps and later
releasing them, at least sometimes after raping them. While such
instances could fit the definition of other enumerated crimes against
humanity,248 approximately how many women lived through this type of
experience is unknown.249

242. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 580
(Sept. 2, 1999). See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and
Judgment, para. 649. (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and
Veselin Sljivancanin, (Case No. IT-95-13-R 61) Review of the Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedure and Evidence, April 3, 1996, at para. 29, quoted in
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 643 (May 7, 1997).
243. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
244. Time for Reckoning, supra note 42.
245. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1999, Human Rights Watch, http://www.
hrw.org/wr2k/Mena-01.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
246. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7(2)(i).
247. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 183, 221, 231; Algeria: Human Rights
Developments 1995, supra note 36. While the FIS was certainly a political organization,
generally, it does not appear that those who committed violent acts against civilians were
directly connected to the party. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1993, Human
Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Middle-01.htm#P63_37797 (last
visited Mar. 16, 2008); Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1996, Human Rights
Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/ME-01.htm#P89_36462 (last visited
Mar. 16, 2008). See also supra Part I(b). Moreover, despite some ambiguous statements
made by the FIS early on in the conflict, representatives came to clearly condemn and
disassociate the party from abuses on civilians. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 172; Algeria:
Human Rights Developments 1992, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/
reports/1993/WR93/Mew-01.htm#P71_39546 (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); Algeria:
Human Rights Developments 1993, supra note 247; Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1994, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/MIDEAST01.htm#P90_29860 (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); Algeria: Human Rights Developments
1995, supra note 36.
248. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7(1)(e), 7(1)(h).
249. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 219–20.
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Regarding torture, tens of thousands of Algerians have suffered this
abuse.250 In all likelihood, state forces were responsible for the vast
majority of these violations,251 thereby establishing a widespread
practice. The second factor for crimes against humanity, “attack directed
against any civilian population,” is also satisfied. State-led torture was
directed against civilians, its victims having protected status whether or
not they actively participated in the hostilities, as they were necessarily
detained at the time they were tortured.252 These well-orchestrated253 acts
of torture carried out at numerous secret detention facilities254 fulfill the
state policy requirement, which is informal and may be deduced from the
acts in question.255 The last requirement, “knowledge of the attack,”
refers to the perpetrator “understand[ing] the overall context of his
act,”256 a relatively low threshold that is easily satisfied. Thus, state
forces committed crimes against humanity when they tortured.
Lastly, extrajudicial killings perpetrated by both security forces and
armed groups also constitute crimes against humanity. It is first
250. See supra Part I(b). For testimonies of Algerians who were tortured, see Algérie,
La machine de mort: Témoignages de victims de la torture, Algeria-Watch (Oct. 2003),
http://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_fr/machine_mort_temoignages.pdf.
251. Based on information culled from a wide variety of sources, a detailed chart of
300 Algerians who were tortured can be found at Algérie, La machine de mort: 300 cas
de tortures, Algeria-Watch (Oct. 2003), http://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_fr/ma
chine_mort_300_cas.pdf. 296 people were abducted by state agents and the remaining 4
were the victims of civil militias. Id. at 28, 42, 44–45.
One occasionally encounters reported instances of torture by armed guerillas.
Fear and Silence, supra note 38, at 24; Smith, infra note 294. Although it is possible that
this practice was frequent enough to be widespread, at present, the available evidence
does not seem to suggest it.
252. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7(2)(e); Protocol II, supra note 83, art. 4(1).
253. Algérie, La Machine de mort: Un rapport sur la torture, les centres de détentions
secrets et l’organisation de la machine de mort, Algeria-Watch (Oct. 2003), http://www.
algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_fr/machine_mort_rapport.pdf.
254. Fear and Silence, supra note 38.
255. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, para. 653
(May 7, 1997). As an illustration of just how commonplace torture was in Algeria,
consider what one local policeman is reported to have told a mother seeking information
about her disappeared son, “‘Of course we torture people: they always have something to
confess. You’re all terrorists. You gave birth to terrorists. So everything that’s happening
is normal.’” Kristianasen, infra note 293.
256. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1, Judgment, para. 133 (May 21,
1999). See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, para.
659 (May 7, 1997) (stating “the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the
civilian population, know that his act fits with the attack and the act must not be taken for
purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict,” where knowledge may be actual
or constructive).
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important to acknowledge that identifying which murders were directed
against civilians is inherently fact specific.257 Analysis is further
complicated by the widely held suspicion that the regime infiltrated
certain armed groups and incited or recruited members to perpetrate
barbarous acts for the purpose of justifying the 1992 coup and shifting
public opinion in its favor.258 Similarly, the regime carried out
indiscriminate attacks and then sought to attribute them to Islamist

257. In deciding whether an attack was “directed against any civil population,” the
ICTY set forth the following criteria:
[I]nter alia, the means and method used in the course of the attack,
the status of the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of
the attack, the nature of the crimes committed in its course, the
resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to which the
attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply
with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 91 (June 12, 2002)
(stating that “‘the civilian population is the primary object of the attack.’”). See also
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, para. 207 (Jan. 27, 2000) (“[T]he fact
that there are certain individuals among the civilian population who are not civilians does
not deprive the population of its civilian character.”).
258. See generally, e.g., MOHAMMED SAMRAOUI, CHRONIQUE DES ANNÉES DE SANG,
ALGÉRIE: COMMENT LES SERVICES SECRETS ONT MANIPULÉ LES GROUPES ISLAMISTES
(Denoel 2003). Such activities are infamously well known among scholars on Algeria:
[Senior military officers have] been linked to such high-profile
incidents as kidnapping of three officials from the French embassy in
Algiers in October 1993; the high-jacking of an Air France Airbus in
1994; bombings of France’s public transport system, including the
Paris Metro, in 1995; the kidnapping and murder of the Tibhirine
monks in 1996, and a number of other such incidents.
Jeremy Keenan, Waging War on Terror: The Implications of America’s ‘New
Imperialism’ for Saharan Peoples, 10 J. N. AFR. STUD. 619, 625 (2005) (describing the
regime’s alleged staging of “terrorist” activities in the Sahara-Sahel region beginning in
2002). Regarding the junta’s orchestration of the 1995 Paris bomb attacks, which were
blamed on Algerian fanatics, one former Algerian secret police agent, for example,
testified that he was instructed to bribe European officials, who were complicit, and
personally delivered $90,000 in hush money to a member of the French parliament. John
Sweeney & Leonard Doyle, Algeria Regime ‘Was Behind Paris Bombs,’ Manchester
Guardian, Nov. 16, 1997, http://desip.igc.org/Algerian.html. See also, e.g., EVANS &
PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 221–24, 287–88; SOUAÏDIA, supra note 35, at 56–59; YOUS,
supra note 35; The Junta In Court, supra note 26 (quoting testimony from the former
Chief of Special Units, who relayed that a colonel, referring to a leader of an armed group
known for slaughtering women and children, told him, “‘[H]e is our man, you will work
together with him’”).
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factions.259 These tactics ultimately led to a commonly asked question
among Algerians, qui tue qui—“who’s killing whom”?
Notwithstanding these challenges, certain reasonable appraisals can be
made. Extrajudicial killings by the regime were widespread. Based only
on the most reliable and sufficiently specific estimates, hundreds of
extrajudicial killings were committed by security forces in 1995, 1997,
and 1998,260 Such acts were also reported in 1994,261 1995, 1999, 2000,
and 2002, although in lesser general numbers.262 In December 2004, an
investigator authorized by the government even confessed that security
forces are thought to have killed a total of 5200 civilians in “illegal
acts.”263 State forces will again inevitably fall within the two additional
requirements, organizational policy264 and “knowledge of the attack.”
259. For example, one family reported that after security forces killed five of their
immediate male relatives in front of them in their home, the security forces asked them to
sign a statement that “terrorists” committed the murders. Annual Report for Algeria 1997,
Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=C31D660257E
B53E080256A0F005BEA9E&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). See also, e.g., EVANS
& PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 194–98, 225, 229–31, 246, 249–50, 261–62, 287, 296.
260. Annual Report for Algeria 1995, Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty
usa.org/annualreport.php?id=DC29278C303A801680256A0F005BB4B1&c=DZA (last
visited Mar. 16, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 1997, supra note 259; Annual Report
for Algeria 1998, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id
=C91D0197E237ADDE80256A0F005C025D&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
261. For a list of over 100 reported instances of murder(s) carried out by state security
forces, the majority of which occurred in 1994, see COMITÉ ALGÉRIEN DES MILITANTS
LIBRES DE LA DIGNITÉ HUMAINE ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, LIVRE BLANC SUR LA
RÉPRESSION EN ALGÉRIE (1991–1994) (OU L’HISTOIRE DE LA TRAGÉDIE D’UN PEOPLE) TOME
I 63–77 (Hoggar 1995).
262. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1995, supra note 36; Algeria: Human
Rights Developments 1994, supra note 247; Annual Report for Algeria 1999, Amnesty
International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=A0729B516A6823B0802
56A0F005C1B25&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 2000,
Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=CCCFC26F040
13D12802568E400729EC9&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); Annual Report for
Algeria 2002, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=
2709795C610F55D980256BAE0056CA88&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
263. ROBERT FISK, THE GREAT WAR FOR CIVILIZATION: THE CONQUEST OF THE MIDDLE
EAST 584 (2005).
264. As an illustration of this policy, consider what signs placed on the corpses in one
city read: “‘[T]his is the fate reserved for those who encourage the terrorists.’” Some of
the murdered had shattered skulls. Some had had their organs removed. One man’s face
was beyond recognition due to torture. Firemen told the Algerian Committee of Free
Activists for Human Dignity and Human Rights that “they had received orders ‘from the
top’ not to remove the cadavers before eight in the morning so that the population could
see them in the meantime.” COMITÉ ALGÉRIEN DES MILITANTS LIBRES DE LA DIGNITÉ
HUMAINE ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, supra note 261, at 75–76 (author’s translation).
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Armed groups also murdered civilians. Scores of these deaths, frequently
estimated to run into the hundreds, were reported each year between
1993 and 2004. Given the clandestine nature of the conflict, however,
these approximate death tolls differentiate between neither causes of
death—whether death was due to a massacre, bomb attack, or individual
assault—nor groups of non-state actors.265 Even if only a fraction of
these deaths were due to murder and correctly attributed to a given
faction, they would almost certainly satisfy the widespread requirement.
Inferring the remaining two factors should prove unproblematic. Thus,
murders by opposition forces amount to crimes against humanity, and
each of the three amnestied abuses perpetrated by the regime likewise fit
within this category.
B. Legitimacy by “Democratic” Referendum?
Under Algeria’s treaty obligations as well as the customary duty to
prosecute, a referendum on the amnestying of grave human rights
violations,266 war crimes, or crimes against humanity is ipso facto void.
Nevertheless, the legal unsoundness of the Charter established in Parts II
and III of this Note may seem troubling, as the official vote tally for the

265. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1993, Human Rights Watch, http://www.
hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Middle-01.htm#P63_37797 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008);
Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1994, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/
reports/1995/WR95/MIDEAST-01.htm#P90_29860 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Algeria:
Human Rights Developments 1995, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1996/WR96/MIDEAST-01.htm#P137_26320 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Algeria:
Human Rights Developments 1996, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1997/WR97/ME-01.htm#P89_36462 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Algeria: Human Rights
Developments 1997, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Mideast01.htm#P207_37583 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Algeria: Human Rights Developments
1998, Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/worldreport99/mideast/algeria.html (last
visited Mar. 17, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 1997, supra note 259; Annual Report
for Algeria 1998, supra note 260; Annual Report for Algeria 1999, supra note 262; Annual Report for Algeria 2000, supra note 262; Annual Report for Algeria 2001, Amnesty
International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=426DF7C05D7F48A5802
56A16004BE7EE&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 2002,
supra note 262; Annual Report for Algeria 2003, Amnesty International, http://www.
amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=2A0BB2E9CC487AEC80256D24003790E9&c=DZA
(last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 2004, Amnesty International,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=29F1B4B25091AC9980256E9E005A
99AC&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
266. See, e.g., Mendoza, supra note 141, para. 32 (referring to Uruguay’s plebiscite on
its amnesty law and stating that “[a] fortiori, a country cannot by internal legislation
evade its international obligations”).
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Charter referendum might suggest wide support.267 On this assumption,
representatives of the United States, France, and the European Union
formally endorsed the Charter.268 These officials were apparently
undisturbed by the following question: Does democracy support the
proposition that a majority vote can be taken on the denial of citizens’
rights?269 The paramount issue, though, is whether the referendum
accurately reflects the wishes of the victims, which presents difficult and
divisive issues. Virtually all of Algeria suffered, but are all Algerians
victims, as the state maintains?270 While the capacity for human
compassion towards the pain of others should not be denied, is vicarious
the same as personally endured suffering?
Even if one responds to this question in the affirmative—deeming the
overwhelming majority of the Algerian people to be the victims—there is
still good reason to be highly skeptical of the referendum as an
expression of broad backing for the Charter. Unverified by any
independent audit,271 the plebiscite took place in a police state where
267. See Algeria Today, supra note 64.
268. U.S. Respects Algeria Reconciliation Charter, State Welch Says, U.S.
International Information Programs, Mar. 20, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/
display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=March&x=20060320160211ndyblehs0.10
67469; Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Paris, Algeria /
Referendum (Sept. 30, 2005); Press Release, European Union, Declaration by the
Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on Algeria’s Referendum on a Charter for
Peace and National Reconciliation (Oct. 10, 2005).
269. U.S. and French interests are not limited to significant investment ties with
Algeria. Both American and French intelligence services have long been suspected of
collaborating with Algerian secret services during the Dirty War and beyond. See, e.g.,
Keenan, supra note 258, at 628. For an in depth look at France’s support for and
complicity with Algeria’s mafia-like insiders in their staging of violence and
manipulations of public opinion, see generally LOUNIS AGGOUN & JEAN-BAPTISTE
RIVOIRE, FRANÇALGÉRIE, CRIMES ET MENSONGES D’ETATS: HISTOIRE SECRÈTE, DE LA
GUERRE D’INDÉPENDANCE À LA “TROISIÈME GUERRE” D’ALGÉRIE (Découverte 2004). An
overview of this book in English can be found at Françalgérie: On the Secret War in
Algeria and French Machinations, Algeria-Watch, July 2004, http://www.algeriawatch.org/en/aw/francalgerie.htm.
After September 11th, the United States closely allied itself with Algiers, President Bush offering unwavering approval of the regime’s strategy in response to
“terrorism.” E.g. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 278–79, 287–89, 292. In a display
characteristic of the Bush administration’s “dead on” understanding of the Middle East
and North Africa, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and North African
Affairs told the New York Times: “‘Washington has much to learn from Algeria on ways
to fight terrorism.’” Steven R. Weisman, U.S. to Sell Military Gear to Algeria to Help it
Fight Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002.
270. See Draft Charter, supra note 59.
271. Slackman, supra note 65.
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electoral deceit has been a recurrent allegation.272 There were likewise
serious charges of fraud surrounding the referendum in question.273
Moreover, voters might not have fully appreciated the significance of the
text they were actually given. Those who did vote had only forty-five
days to consider the Draft Charter, which differed from the final
legislation in key aspects.274 Freedom of the press is quite poor in
Algeria.275 Journalists have often been harassed and sacked with heavy
defamation charges under strict press laws.276 State security forces, for
example, “savagely attacked” one French journalist who attempted to
cover the amnesty campaign in September 2005.277 Radio and television,
the two chief media outlets, are primarily government controlled.278 No
viewpoint critical of the amnesty was expressed on television.279
Fittingly, it has been reported that there was little if any debate on the
Charter leading up to the referendum,280 critics of the law were swiftly
272. See Observations du Collectif des Familles de Disparu(e)s en Algérie sur le
respect par l’Algérie de ses obligations découlant du Pacte international relatif aux
droits civils et politiques, Rapport alternatif à l’attention du Comité des droits de
l’Homme, 90éme session du Comité de droits de l’Homme, Examen du rapport de
l’Algérie le 23 juillet 2007, at 8, 63–64, 74, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/
docs/ngos/fidh_algeria.pdf [hereinafter CFDA Rapport]. Even a top Algerian official in
charge of voting has voiced concern. In a letter dated May 17, 2007 and addressed to
Boutiflika, Saïd Bouachaïr, the Coordinator of the National Political Commission for the
Monitoring of Legislative Elections, requested intervention after finding widespread
fraud in the 2007 parliamentary and regional elections. According to Bouachaïr,
non-FLN observers were not permitted to monitor polling stations. Voting boxes arrived
at polling stations pre-filled with pro-FLN votes and some were even stolen after votes
were cast. Similarly, lists of the candidates running were left incomplete. Letter from
Saïd Bouachaïr, Al-Lajna al-Siyāsiyya al-Wataniyya li-Murāqabat al-Intikhābāt
al-Tashrī’yya, ‘udū al-Lajna, Al-munassiq, to Ra’īs al-Jumhūriyya (May 17, 2007),
reproduced in id. at 77–78.
273. See CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 63–64.
274. See supra Part I(c).
275. Algeria was rated “not free” by the World Audit Organization, landing a score of
62 out of 100. World Audit Organization, Freedom of the Press Report, Algeria,
http://www.worldaudit.org/presstable.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter World
Audit Report]. Similarly, in the 2006 World Press Freedom Index, Algeria ranked 126
out of 168 countries. Reporters Without Borders For Press Freedom, World Press
Freedom Index 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19385 (last visited Nov.
8, 2007).
276. In 2005, for example, there were 114 documented cases of press harassment. U.S.
Dept. of State, Country Reports of Human Rights Practices, Algeria, Mar. 6, 2007,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78849.htm.
277. CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 49 (author’s translation).
278. World Audit Report, supra note 275.
279. CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 49.
280. Hidouci, infra note 287, at 4.
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silenced, and “police arrested those who collected signatures” against
it.281 Those who disfavored the amnesty were harassed, threatened with
death, and sometimes imprisoned.”282 Freedom of association fairs no
better.283 No less than three demonstrations against the Charter held by
families of the disappeared were aggressively dispersed.284 Among
numerous other restrictions and bans, the Algerian authorities would not
locate a room for a public gathering to discuss the Charter, a meeting
which resultantly could not take place.285 Although one can find opinions
from within Algeria both for and against the amnesty law,286 at present,
there is little reliable evidence that determines just how representative
these opinions are287 given the socio-political climate in Algeria as well
as the specific context of the referendum.
281. Al Karama for Human Rights and Algeria-Watch, Observations on the Periodic
Report to the Human Rights Committee, Algeria-Watch, July 23, 2007, http://en.al
karama.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45&Itemid=37.
282. CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 6, 53.
283. For a recent analysis of the Algerian law on associations, see Chafika Kahina
Bouagache, The Algerian Law on Associations Within Its Historical Context, The
International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law, vol. 8, issue 2, Apr. 2007, http://www.icnl.
org/knowledge/ijnl/vol9iss2/special_3.htm#_edn1.
284. Relatives were questioned and threatened. More ominously, after the authorities
failed to investigate ten complaints filed by his family, one man whose father was
disappeared was sued for defamation by the two alleged perpetrators after he made public
accusations. Belkacem Rachedi was fined and sentenced as a result of at least one of the
suits. Annual Report for Algeria 2006, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.
org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2006&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
285. Al Karama, supra note 281.
286. See, e.g., Daho Djerbal, Algeria: Amnesty and Oligarchy, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Arab Reform Bulletin: October 2005, vol. 3 issue 8, http://www.
carnegieendowment.org/files/Djerbal.pdf; Louisa Hanoune, On the Eve of the September
29 Referendum, Fraternité, The Newspaper of the Workers Party of Algeria, Sept. 11,
2005, http://www.eit-ilc.org/us/articles.php?Ing=en&pg=455. For a collection of articles
addressing the “reconciliation” process, the majority of which were authored by
Algerians, see QUELLE RÉCONCILIATION POUR ALGÉRIE (2005), available at http://www.
hoggar.org/books/Reconciliation/Reconciliation.pdf. Twenty of the twenty-seven
contributors signed an appended list of recommendations that, among other things, calls
for “instructing and judging those most responsible for the most serious crimes
(massacres, forced disappearances, rapes, and torture)” as well as “excluding serious
crimes with respect to international law” from an amnesty. Id. at 228 (author’s
translation).
287. Echoing the overall suspiciousness of the referendum, the former
Algerian Minister of Economics and Finances (1989–1991), Ghazi Hidouci, has
asserted that the government strategically employed voting in order to bypass
public debate and use “the will of the people” as a buffer against conflicting
international law. Ghazi Hidouci, “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation” in
Algeria: Threatening Contradictions, 9 Arab Reform Brief, Arab Reform Initiative,
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On the other hand, if one considers the victims to be those who were
massacred, killed in bomb attacks, executed, raped, tortured, and forcibly
disappeared, as well as the families of these direct victims, 288 the legal
obligations in question are all too appropriate.289 There are victims who
affirmatively reject the amnesty law.290 As noted above, the families of
the disappeared attempted to demonstrate against the Charter prior to the
referendum.291 On the day of the referendum, in one suburb of the capital
victims and families who lost their loved ones buried their ballots at a

July 15, 2006, http://www.arab-reform.net/IMG/pdf/Papier_No9_Algerie_anglais_final_
ghazi_hidouci.pdf.
288. The word, “victims,” henceforth will be used in this sense, unless otherwise
indicated.
289. Even accepting the government’s figures, statistically, the referendum cannot be
said to account for their wishes with any accuracy. The population of Algeria is currently
estimated at 33.3 million. Algeria Country Profile, supra note 70. 18.3 million Algerians
are registered to vote and purportedly the referendum had a 79.76% voter turnout, which
calculates to approximately 14.6 million who “actually” voted. If 97.36% voted for the
Charter, then roughly 14.2 million supported it. See Algeria Today, supra note 64. This
last figure is about 42.6% of the entire population. Compare this with an estimate of the
number of victims, for which purposes we will assume the worst likely figures. 200,000
Algerians lost their lives and 8000 were disappeared. Chronology (Part Two), supra note
51. Women’s rights advocates estimate that approximately 5,000 women were raped.
Algeria: Human Rights Developments 2000, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/
wr2k1/mideast/algeria.html (last viewed Mar. 12, 2008). The author has not encountered
narrowly estimated figures for tortures. Let us consider that 50,000 citizens were tortured.
The total number of direct victims then morbidly reaches 263,000. Concerning their
immediate family members, choosing the year from which to pull the average household
size in Algeria is problematic, as the ages of the victims vary widely. Some victims had
families of their own, others were too young. Assuming the former, we will factor by not
only the average family size from 1966, 5.9 members, but also the more recent
demographic from 1987, 7 members. Encyclopedia of Nations, Social and Humanitarian
Assistance, The Family—Society’s Building Block, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com
/United-Nations/Social-and-Humanitarian-Assistance-THE-FAMILY-SOCIETY-S-BUIL
DING-BLOCK.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). Thus, there are approximately 3.4
million victims, which constitute 10.1% of the Algerian populace.
290. Although reference to statistics has been made in order to disprove the contention
that the referendum represents the wishes of the victims, this Note does not advocate their
use in deciding whether justice should be pursued. In addition to violating established
legal principles, deferring to majority opinion among victims would present deeply
problematic moral dilemmas. For example, would a simple majority vote among the
victims suffice, even if 60% favored amnesty and 40% rejected it, or 70% and 30%,
respectively? There are victims who support the Charter. See, e.g., Daikha Dridi, Victims
Groups Question Algeria Amnesty, AL JAZEERA, Sept. 30, 2005, http://english.
aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=14563. However, this should not be
determinative.
291. Annual Report for Algeria 2006, supra note 284.
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local cemetery in protest.292 And three days after the Charter’s passage
six groups that support the victims held a shared press conference to
denounce the amnesty.293 Direct statements from victims and organizers
of associations express a desire for truth and accountability.294 Formal
manifestations of dissent have also been articulated. In April 2007, four
Algerian human rights groups that represent the victims were among the
organizations that signed an open letter to the Council of the European
Union, demanding the abrogation of the Charter, and asserting that the
legislation constitutes a denial of truth and justice for victims of the
amnestied crimes.295 In addition, the Collectif des Familles de
Disparu(e)s en Algérie submitted an extensive shadow report before the
HRC, in which the group requested the body to instruct the Algerian
government to rescind the Charter.296 The report also asked for “a
processing of the cases of the disappeared that allows for the effective
exercise of the right of the families of the disappeared to truth and
justice, the two existing as an integral part of their right to redress.”297

292. Id.
293. Wendy Kristianasen, Algeria: The Women Speak, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Apr.
11, 2006, http://mondediplo.com/2006/04/07algeria.
294. For example, leader of the Sumūd Association of the Families of Victims
Abducted by Islamist Armed Groups, Ali Merabet lost his two brothers, Aziz, twentyeight years old, and Merzak, fourteen; an Islamist group kidnapped, murdered and buried
them in a farmyard. While leaving open the possibility for genuine forgiveness among
victims, Merabet stated: “‘We are not against a national reconciliation, but we do say
“no” to an amnesty decided in a hurry without going through a process that will recover
truth and justice.’” Dridi, supra note 290. Similarly, founder of the Collectif des Familles
de Disparu(e)s en Algérie, Nacéra Dutour, whose son, Amin, was forcibly disappeared,
voiced her rejection of the Charter: “[It] ended the dreams of truth and justice for
thousands of families of the disappeared.” Kristianasen, supra note 293. Cherifa Kheddar
witnessed armed militants haul away her brother and sister. After torturing her brother,
they murdered both in the family’s home in 1996. Kheddar protests every Sunday with
other victims in front of the government palace. She reiterated her demands: “‘[O]ur
position has always been that justice must work first and that those found guilty can be
pardoned later on . . . [b]ut the national reconciliation gives impunity even to those
people who have killed hundreds of times.’” Craig S. Smith, Many Algerians Are Not
Reconciled by Amnesty Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006.
295. This statement was supported by the Ligue Algérienne des Droits de l’Homme,
Ligue Algérienne de Défense des Droits de l’Homme, SOS Disparu, and Collectif des
Familles de Disparu(e)s en Algérie. Open Letter at the Occasion of the EU-Algeria
Association Council, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/348/news/focus/28989.
296. CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 15, 72, 74.
297. Id. at 15 (author’s translation). In referencing the Charter’s violation of the right
to justice, the Collectif des Familles de Disparu(e)s en Algérie cited article 6 of the
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Prior to the Charter, Algerians sought accountability in overseas
courts.298 And in lieu of access to courts, Algerian women staged mock
trials against Islamist opposition groups and figures as well as former
president Benjedid for crimes against humanity.299
Thus, the claim that the referendum widely represents the wishes of the
“victims” is doubtful at best, whether the victims are understood to be
the Algerian people or those who have suffered crimes and their families.
The possible concern—or perhaps hypocritical assertion of cultural
relativism—that a duty to prosecute is yet another patriarchal, colonial

Convention on Disappearance, which requires a state party to hold perpetrators criminally
responsible.” Id. at 14.
298. In April 2001, an Algerian family who lost their son to torture as well as two
detainees subjected to this abuse filed civil complaints in France against General Khaled
Nezzar. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 280–81. Alleging liability for crimes
committed under his direction, including deaths, acts of torture, internments, and
disappearances, in July 2002, victims again lodged complaints against Nezzar in a Paris
criminal court. Press Release, Justitia Universalis, Algérie: Justitia Universalis dépose
une plainte contre le général Khaled Nezzar (July 1, 2002). And Abderrahmane El Mehdi
Mosbah, an asylee from Algeria, brought a complaint in December 2003 with the Paris
public prosecutor against General Larbi Belkheir for the acts of torture he endured for
forty days in the winter of 2003, charging Belkheir’s responsibility in instigating and
erecting a policy of torture. Press Release, Justitia Universalis, Algérie: M. A. El Mehdi
Mosbah et Justitia Universalis déposent plainte contre le général Larbi Belkheir
(Communiqué de Maître Willian Bourdon, avocat à Paris) (Dec. 10, 2003). See also, e.g.,
Criminal Lawsuits Against Algeria’s Generals, Algeria-Watch, Jan. 2004, http://www.
algeria-watch.org/en/aw/criminal_lawsuits.htm.
A civil action in the United States was also brought. Algerian citizens and the
Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Democrates (“RAFD”) brought suit in federal
district court under the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victims Protection Act against
the FIS and one of its members for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and additional
breaches of international and domestic law. Plaintiffs included family members of the
murdered. RAFD sued on behalf of those targeted by Islamist groups. Doe v. Islamic
Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 115, 117–18 (D.C. 2003) (granting summary judgment for
the defendant).
299. RANJANA KHANNA, ALGERIA CUTS: WOMEN & REPRESENTATION, 1830 TO THE
PRESENT 68–70 (2008). For a theoretical reading of “virtual justice” within an Algerian
context, see id. at 68–99.
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imposition on Algeria is misplaced.300 Many victims desire truth and
justice,301 and they believe the Charter extinguishes both.
CONCLUSION
Since the Algerian state passed the Charter in February 2006, the
country’s fourth grant of amnesty, has Algeria enjoyed peace? December
10, 2006: A bomb goes off on a bus with foreign oil workers, killing two
people. February 13, 2007: Seven bombs explode, killing six people.
April 10, 2007: Bombs explode in Algiers, killing thirty-three people.
July 11, 2007: A suicide bomb blows up a vehicle close to an army
barrack, killing eight people. September 6, 2007: A suicide bomb
detonates before a presidential visit, killing twenty. September 8, 2007:
A car bomb goes off at a coastguard barracks, killing thirty people.302
300. While acknowledging that the universality of human rights norms can be
challenged, for purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to point out that this particular issue
does not seem to be a preoccupation for the majority of Algerians. For an interesting
analysis of Islamic law’s emphasis on duties and their relation to human rights, see Jason
Morgan-Foster, Note, Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the
International Human Rights Movement, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 67 (2005).
301. At minimum, under the International Covenant, Algeria has a duty to investigate
and reveal sufficient information to victims and their families. Supra note 105. A
customary right to truth appears to be budding. See Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth
in International Law: Fact or Fiction? 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 245, 254–67 (2006).
For a sketching of the parameters of this right, see id. at 262–63.
The relation “between” truth and justice is hotly contested. Id. at 269–72. At least
one scholar has suggested, for example, that the process of communally approaching “the
truth” may be an adequate form of justice itself. See Slye, supra note 130, at 246–47.
This is the often-touted model of “restorative justice,” which South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission is supposed to represent. Some have championed restorative
justice to the exclusion of criminal accountability in transitional states emerging from
turmoil, frequently engaging in an ironic tug of war over perceptions of victims’ needs,
which they argue are better honored by the former of the two models. Aside from having
a polarizing effect, choosing truth over justice or vice versa is unnecessary. A balanced
approach is possible and should be supported. For a collection of works on the topic, see
TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE
SEARCH FOR TRUTH (William A. Schabas & Shane Darcy eds., 2004). A strong illustration of the two’s co-existence can be found in Sierra Leone’s experience. See William A.
Shabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE
TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 3 (William A. Schabas
& Shane Darcy eds., 2004) (“The real lesson of the Sierra Leone experiment is that truth
commissions and courts can work productively together, even if they only work in
parallel.”).
302. Chronology—Armed Attacks and Bombings in Maghreb States, Reuters, Jan. 29,
2008. The September 6th attack was carried out by a boy only fifteen years old. Salima
Tlemçaci, Attentat suicide contre la caserne de Dellys (Boumerdes), EL WATAN, Sept. 10,
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December 11, 2007: Two bombs explode in the capital near the
Constitutional Council and offices of the U.N., killing an estimated sixty.303 Meanwhile, state security forces have continued to detain and torture people.304 As a result of ongoing fighting, 400 people, including
many civilians, were killed in 2006,305 and the following year witnessed
the deaths of 300 people, at least seventy of whom were civilians.306 In
assessing the causes of the recent bombings, analysts have drawn
attention to poverty, pervasive unemployment, and broad alienation from
politics in Algeria.307 These deeper causes of violence serve as a
reminder that amnesty is not the panacea for meaningful peace,308 an
observation at least some Algerians appear to support.309
A shrewd politician, Boutiflika has been mindful of the complex host
of issues confronting Algeria, seeking to revamp the country politically
and economically310 and strengthening the presidency311 at the expense of
2007, http://www.elwatan.com. There is one main lingering group that is suspected to be
responsible, the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, which changed its name
from the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat in early 2007.
303. “Dozens killed” in Algeria Blasts, BBC, Dec. 11, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/7137997.stm.
304. Algeria: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International, Sept.
2007, 1–2, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/AI-Algeria.pdf.
305. Annual Report for Algeria 2006, supra note 284.
306. Annual Report for Algeria 2007, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.
org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2007&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
307. William McLean, Algeria Rebel Attacks Test Government Security Policy, Reuters, Sept. 23, 2007.
308. In keeping with this insight, a prominent scholar on Algeria stated:
Turning the page on this decade without seeking to understand the
mechanisms which pushed the society of this young state into selfdestruction would constitute a headlong rush toward unforeseeable
political consequences. The mourning process of Algerian society
can be brought to closure only by acknowledging the drama that has
taken place, and by a political willingness to bring justice to all those
who have been its victims.
Luis Martinez, Why the Violence in Algeria? J. N. AFR. STUD. 14, 26 (2004) (arguing that
“the failure of democratic transition” is the central factor in explaining what gave rise to
the violence).
309. Concerning Algerians’ reactions to the bombings, a survey conducted by the
independent daily newspaper, El Khabar, revealed that 76% of the 10,016 questioned “do
[not] think that national reconciliation is sufficient to confront the recent terrorist
outbreak.” Djalel Bouâti, La réconciliation ne peut pas, à elle seule, venir à bout du
terrorisme, AL KHABAR, Sept. 23, 2007, http://www.elkhabar.com (author’s translation).
310. For a look at Boutiflika’s efforts to improve Algeria’s foreign relations and
prospects for foreign investments, see Yahia H. Zoubir, The Resurgence of Algeria’s
Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century 9 J. N. AFR. STUD. 169 (2004).
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the army. Engaging in a power struggle with this historically dominant
faction,312 Boutiflika was able to use the disclosures of its tactics during
the Dirty War in order to leverage not only the army’s retreat from
politics and a rearrangement of its command, but also the retirement of
the generals who waged the 1992 coup and subsequent campaign of
terror.313 However, this balance of power is precarious, as the generals
have sought to develop their own influential networks, especially with
those sympathetic to the “war on terror.”314 Efforts at overhauling a
profoundly defective judiciary have also been initiated.315 In January
2000, Boutiflika created the National Commission for Judicial Reform,
which produced a report that included recommendations he vowed to
follow. After its release, Boutiflika dismissed several judges on
corruption charges and the majority of magistrates. The President
identified three key relevant phases, improving prison conditions, the
quality of magistrates, and the independence of the courts.316
While these initiatives are positive, Algeria undeniably has a long and
daunting path ahead towards establishing truth as well as justice for the
crimes committed during its conflict. Regardless of the barriers to be
faced, however, international law, both in treaty and custom, requires
that justice be served after certain occurrences. Algeria’s treaty
obligations establish the invalidity of the Charter, as perpetrators of gross
violations of human rights must be prosecuted and punished under the
Convention Against Torture, International Covenant, and African
Charter. Similarly, grave war crimes and crimes against humanity may
311. An early assessment, optimistic of Boutiflika’s strengthening of the presidency
can be located at Robert Mortimer, Boutiflika and Algeria’s Path from Revolt to
Reconciliation 99 CURRENT HIST. 10 (2000).
312. Ulla Holm, Algeria: President Bouteflika’s Second Presidential Term, Dansk
Institut for International Studier (November 2004).
313. After serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs during what most Algerians consider
to have been the country’s golden era, the Houari Boumedienne years (1965–1978), Boutiflika lived in exile from 1981 until 1987 and then ran as an independent candidate
backed by the military in the 1999 presidential elections. Boutiflika’s apparent lack of
involvement in the regime’s violence was partly perceived as a source of legitimacy.
EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 255–56; STORA, supra note 11, at 145, 259–61.
314. Hugh Roberts, Demilitarizing Algeria, 12–18, Carnegie Papers No. 86, Middle
East Program (May 2007).
315. For perspectives on the Algerian judiciary and the challenges it faces from two
American judges who visited Algeria as part of independent reform efforts, see Hon.
James G. Glazebrook, Judicial Independence in the Democratic Republic of Algeria, 43
No. 1 JUDGES’ J. 44 (2004); Joseph P. Nadeau, Algeria 2001: Quest for Democracy, 40
No. 3 JUDGES’ J. 38 (2004).
316. Youcef Bouandel, Bouteflika’s Reforms and the Question of Human Rights in
Algeria, 7 J. N. AFR. STUD. 23, 32–36 (2002).
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not be amnestied under general international law. Concerns that the
customary duty to prosecute will perpetuate conflict and destabilize
societies should not dictate exceptions to the rule. Permitting legal
concessions to political expediency fails to account for the slackening
over the long-term of any apparent tensions between peace and justice,
and the effects of this norm are far less drastic than are sometimes
assumed.
In passing the Charter, Algeria breached the customary obligation to
prosecute, as the crimes it amnestied were not only war crimes, but also
crimes against humanity. Disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial
killings committed by state forces, and murder perpetrated by armed
groups are within this latter class of crimes. Concerning Algerians’
response to the amnestying of these crimes, even if it were legal to hold a
referendum on this issue—and it is not—the results of the plebiscite on
the Charter are not genuinely representative of domestic opinion. More
importantly, consideration should be given to the voices of those who
have more directly suffered, Algerians who were tortured or raped,
Algerians whose family members were disappeared, killed or massacred.
The Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation has brought neither
peace, nor reconciliation. When will the Algerian state seek peace with
its people? When will it reconcile itself with the law?
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